9 144-13 – Superstorm Sandy in NJ

Sandy in New Jersey: DR-4086-NJ

In many ways, I can probably write an entire book about my Superstorm Sandy adventures in New Jersey, which were outside of the Red Cross (maybe I will someday). For this book however, I will focus on the Red Cross-related leadership lessons learned and applied later on – that is what will probably work best. At least for now.

I pretty much hit the ground running during the Response phase for Sandy. I was still an employee with the Red Cross in 2012, and having experienced Irene the year before, I had learned a couple of pre-storm lessons. Mostly for personal safety and sanity. Number one of which was to prepare and protect my own family. So, unlike the first night – and next day or more – of Irene when I was effectively stuck at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), I rode out this storm at home with my family. This time, we were much better prepared with  power, food, and other supplies for this hurricane, as well. I had two generators (a 5,000 watt primary and a 3,500 watt, as a backup) and ten gallons of gasoline – that would last us for 24 hours straight.

FYI – We were out of power at my home for nine days straight during this storm. It was not the first time I miscalculated the level of preparedness needed for major disasters, and it would not be the last, either.

Sandy was a storm which was 1,000 miles wide and took 24 hours to completely pass by my house (and everyone else’s in New Jersey). Even if you lived away from the short, that is a lot of wind and rain for a very long time.

The next day I drove in my Red Cross sport utility vehicle from my home in Union County to the New Jersey SEOC in West Trenton. On a normal day because of traffic, this would take about 45 minutes to do. That first day, I made it there in 20 minutes, flat. No traffic other than police vehicles and fire trucks, for miles and miles.

I would go back and forth each day there, for the next thirty days. Then we moved the entire operation to a Joint Field Office (JFO) for about six months, into 2013.

During the time at the SEOC, my focus was on two major things for the Red Cross – providing intelligence to the state on the status of sheltering (in New Jersey, the Red Cross is a supporting partner for sheltering, but at FEMA we are a co-lead. This can lead to challenges with which shelters get counted, when, and by whom), and also coordinating any request to the Red Cross from government. The way the SEOC works (best) in a home rule state such as New Jersey, is when the municipalities need assistance for any emergency support functions (sheltering is part of one  called Mass Care), they make a request to their county. If that county can help, they do. If the county needs help, they make a request to the state. If the state can help, it does. If it cannot, then – and only then on these large scale incidents – the state asks the Red Cross for help on sheltering. Sometimes it is other things like feeding, or distribution of blankets. Generally, it is help with mass care.

On smaller disasters, these requests may come to the Red Cross right from the municipalities or the counties; especially if the state and the SEOC are not activated. One challenge is that the counties and municipalities get used to the idea of contacting the Red Cross directly (as they do for regional/smaller flooding incidents, multi-family fires, etc.); and as we found out in Irene, they sometimes get pretty angry when that level of FREE support is not provided. This was one applecart which needed to be upset. One of the lessons learned by me from Irene was to really try and change the paradigm of this – and we needed to do it town by town, county by county across the entire state. Unfortunately with just a little over a year between these two hurricanes, we did not have enough time to complete this.

I managed 2-3 service associates and one supervisor at the SEOC – at one point for the first few days, it was two 12 hours shifts for 24 hour coverage – and also government operations volunteers and paid staff from around the country who were located at key county OEM offices. Some of them – and myself included – had dual reporting roles: within their governmental seats, and also to the Red Cross DRO which was set up elsewhere. This can be a challenge, especially if you need help. Not a lesson learned from me, because candidly I did not need the direct supervision from the Red Cross operation as a liaison officer – I was more like an extension to the command of the operation. In other words, when the state asks the Red Cross for help, that’s pretty much the marching orders for the Red Cross’ DRO.

The 30 days at the SEOC was the real response time for this incident. After that, the time spent – and missions worked on – at the JFO would be considered recovery work. There, as I noted the Red Cross’ role with the state – as far as the state OEM was concerned, was over – since sheltering was done. What they did not fully comprehend was our ongoing roles in disaster assessment for families, coordination of case management for families,  our role in children in disaster planning, how in the world to get people back into their housing or create new housing units out of thin air. There was quite a bit of recovery/mitigation work needed. The state also did not comprehend the significant role the Red Cross in New Jersey – through its leadership role in the NJVOAD, and how this would help the state in its recovery. And most importantly, the role the Red Cross had in supporting the NJVOAD at the time. Part of this was due to the disjunctive nature of who does what at the state. While the overall emergency management is lead by the NJ State Police and their state office of emergency management, sheltering and feeding is lead by the NJ Department of Human Services, volunteer management is lead by the Department of State, disaster health – things like mold concerns, raw sewage in basements, etc. is lead by the Department of Health, and donations management is coordinated by the State’s Treasury Department. So sometimes I would be representing the Red Cross response work, the Red Cross recovery work, and sometimes the NJVOAD work. Lots of moving parts – and some of the folks from these state department groups had never worked in a Joint Field Office before.

Including me.

During the interim recovery phase, when we moved operations for the state and federal coordination to the JFO, I knew the Red Cross had additional roles and responsibilities. At the federal level, at the time, we were a named partner to two of the Recovery Support Functions (RSFs):  Housing and Health & Social Services. There are six RSFs, and for the first time in FEMA history, Superstorm Sandy activated all six. This was also the first DR where they had a Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinating Officer, in addition to the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). New Jersey got help from the national Red Cross operations to support these two RSFs (thank you BB and ADP!) since many times it was difficult to be in three places at once (case management meeting, state housing meeting, children and disasters meeting, voluntary agency liaison meeting, federal RSF, VAL, RSFLG or other meeting, and more). Meanwhile, the Red Cross was somewhat overwhelmed with financial and in-kind donations, that it was novel for them as to what to do. One of their financial paid staff CC was in charge of managing the design of a long-term recovery staffing group to cover all of the impacted counties, provide grant funding to other NGOs to help support the impacted families more directly (and sometimes, such as with construction/repair – not the mission of the Red Cross, directly). The Red Cross also helped convene all of the partners towards resilient housing solutions, with the help of the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) department. I became familiar with the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) and the RSFs just the year before, in 2011 – and it was at the same time – and physical meeting with FEMA in NYC! – that the NJ State Police OEM leads learned about the NDRF, too. In fact, the Major who led the NJ State Police for the SEOC, DM, who was at that 2011 meeting, retired the next year and became the disaster lead for the Red Cross in New Jersey: right before Sandy hit.

Lessons Learned

I certainly learned quite a few lessons in Sandy. Here are some highlights, related to leadership:

• Large scale disasters can be somewhat isolating, especially if you are in an intermediary leadership role such as being a government liaison for a non-governmental organization. Once the response phase was over (effectively the first thirty days after storm landfall, for Sandy), the Red Cross at the time would normally pack up shop and get ready for the next one. They would revert the recovery efforts – on these very large incidents of scale – to the local Chapters and Regions to resolve through steady-state work. Occasionally, Red Cross national support would leave an expert in client casework and/or long-term recovery with the Region, to provide transitional subject-matter expertise. Sandy was way to big for this and we (New Jersey and New York, for sure) needed new Long-Term Recovery staffing from the Red Cross to keep these efforts moving.
• I learned – as noted above – I can lead multiple groups, staff in different roles, etc. without doing all those jobs directly, in other words, wearing all those hats at once. While delegation is certainly an important trait of leadership in any job or role, keeping all those moving parts – and people – in your own head is critical, as well. It should be a mental chess game, planning the next moves in advance as much as you can. I knew what did not go so well in Irene the year before, so I really focused on learning how to solve those past problems through any channels I could find (and I went looking everywhere I could – and made up new channels if I had to), sometimes even before they became current problems.
• I learned there is power in watching and listening to perceptive people (CM, BB, KC, SM, KS, AFB, AM to initial a few) – most of whom had vast, vast disaster experience – make positive changes in problem-solving. Lots of P’s there, right? Anyway, my point is that sometimes it is better to observe and absorb what the experts say and do first, and then take that intelligence and share it with others – not claiming it as your own, but rather making sure the fixes get done. When you put the idea in my head, and if I can run with it – I will run with it. And if you want to sponge from me knowledge, like SS absorbed wisely, I am happy to expound on what I know and what leadership lessons I learned.
• I learned that any bureaucratic impasses or blocks can be overcome with enough perseverance. And, as a leader, if you see a problem you have an obligation to help fix the problem. And that fix might include having someone else get the credit (even if you do most of the work).  I also learned that you do not want to be leading the group – or even representing the group – which is the cause of said impasses or blocks. Many years later, I would refine this concept of “see the problem, fix the problem” to include the fact that sometimes you have to decide whether to risk your own career and/or reputation and stand up for what is right: