When the Carnation Revolution swept away the old regime in Portugal in 1974, the unspeakable adherence to colonialism came to an end and colonial rule collapsed. Although the political awakening of the national self-determination movements in Portuguese Timor received solidarity-based attention in Germany from the very beginning, it did not trigger any major movements or even storms of protest when Indonesia invaded the colony in violation of international law. Compared to the Portuguese colonies in Africa, where liberation movements had been fighting fiercely for years for the independence of their countries, Portuguese Timor was hardly known in Germany. The struggles in the African colonies and the Cold War’s proxy wars fought to their detriment were much more in the focus of solidarity movements in Germany at that time.

At first, however, only a few NGOs, such as the Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker (Society for Threatened Peoples), the Südostasien-Infostelle (Southeast Asia Information Center), and IMBAS (Initiative for the Human Rights of All ASEAN Citizens), as well as a few left-wing committees, supported Fretilin’s liberation struggle and raised awareness about Indonesia’s war in East Timor. Due to a lack of support and interest, the committees collapsed in the early 1980s. The attention of leftist movements for decolonisation processes was slowly declining at that time. Interests shifted to anti-imperialist struggles in Latin and South America and struggles against dictatorships in Africa and Asia.

East Timor did not matter

As with many other countries at that time, East Timor did not really matter. Media coverage of the Indonesian occupation and the ongoing conflict there was quite friendly to the Indonesians (Ludwig and Horta 1985). In fact, there was hardly a single article in the leading German media at the time that dealt critically with the Suharto regime, the role of the military and the serious human rights violations it committed. It would take until Suharto’s forced resignation in 1998 for the mainstream media to portray him as a dictator.

The Federal Republic of Germany, like many other countries in the Western world, had supported Suharto’s New Order regime from the very beginning and kept up good relations. Helmut Kohl, who would become chancellor (1982–1998), even called Suharto a friend. Germany’s occasionally expressed concern about the human rights situation in Timor-Timur, as Indonesia now called its 27th province, was out of proportion to the enormous trade, economic and military relations it maintained with Indonesia. Germany was the third largest arms supplier after the USA and Great Britain. Very few parliamentarians took up the Timor issue (Schlicher 1996).

The German government was in line with its partner Indonesia and followed its propaganda:

• Indonesia had been reacting to a cry for help and ended a civil war, that would reignite as soon as the military left;
• An independent East Timor would not last;
• East Timorese people had accepted the inclusion into the Republic of Indonesia, the resistance was defeated and a state of normality had been reached;
• Reports of human rights violations were exaggerated.

Germany’s political stance was no exception. All over the world, we could see a creeping recognition of the occupation. In not exerting enough pressure, the international community enabled Indonesia to keep up the occupation of East Timor in violation of international law and ignoring UN resolutions. In the meantime, the situation in Timor was deteriorating more and more.

Therefore, something needed to be done. But why should anyone here, so far away from East Timor, care about what happened there? Why should it matter? How could we raise public awareness, challenge the current perception of Indonesia and put the illegal occupation and serious human rights violations on the political agenda?

The significance of the Santa Cruz massacre 1991: a turning point

The momentum for this was given by the resistance in Timor-Timur. With immense courage, young people in Dili took the opportunity to demonstrate. We are all aware of the enormous significance of the Santa Cruz massacre – one of many massacres there. Confronted with Max Stahl’s recordings and eye witness reports, Indonesia could no longer deny the atrocities being committed by its military.

After the Santa Cruz Massacre, international and German solidarity for Timor’s struggle, as well as the movement against the Suharto regime in Indonesia, grew step by step. (Jetschke 1999: 155) In contrast to the support of earlier decades, which had centred around Fretilin, this new support was a more rights-based approach, with human rights and the right to self-determination at its core. With this, more people could be addressed and many more different actors in society could be reached.

Democracy for Indonesia – Self-Determination for East Timor!

This is also reflected in the political developments in East Timor and Indonesia: Resistance leader Xanana Gusmão had created CNRM (The National Council of Maubere Resistance (Portuguese: Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere), later CNRT, an umbrella organisation for the resistance uniting the diverse stakeholders. The diplomatic resistance communicated this change to the outside and insisted on Timor-Leste’s right to self-determination.

The clandestine front used every opportunity to organise demonstrations, not only in Dili, but also in Jakarta. The student resistance groups got in contact with Indonesian activists. The East Timorese resistance thus also had a strong influence on the development of democratic forces in Indonesia under Suharto.

This development was mirrored by NGOs and activists in Germany: solidarity for Timor’s struggle for its right to self-determination, as well as the movement against the Suharto regime in Indonesia was growing. And they joined forces more and more: Because the responsibility for the oppression and human rights violations in Indonesia and East Timor ultimately lay with the Indonesian military and Suharto’s New Order regime.

Even Indonesians, who were forced to live in exile in Europe after the coup 1965/66 and who were well connected to the movement for democracy, supported Timor’s struggle. As supporters of former President Sukarno with a strong nationalistic and anti-colonial stance, this support did not come easily to them.

At annual network meetings in Germany on Indonesia and East Timor, we discussed strategies with activists from the countries and developed joint campaigns. Forging alliances was crucial. The Campaigns against Arms Trade, for example, became a strong partner.

1992/1993 East German peace activists occupy former NPA military vessels meant for sale to Indonesia

In 1992, after reunification, Germany sold 39 beat-up military vessels, which had formerly belonged to the German Democratic Republic’s National People’s Army, to Indonesia.

This deal with Suharto was met with strong opposition not only by Human Rights and Stop Arms Trade NGOs in western Germany (BUKO Kampagne gegen Rüstungsexport, Watch Indonesia!, terre des hommes, GfbV, Südostasien-Informationsstelle and others), and the opposition parties in Parliament (SPD, PDS, Die Grünen), but also by civil liberty and peace activists in Eastern Germany (like Neues Forum in Berlin, Timor und kein Trupp, Dresdner Rüstungsgegner, Wolfspelz). In May 1993 about 400 activists occupied the vessels in Peenemünde harbour at Usedom. They would rather see them scrapped then handed over to Dictator Suharto. The illegal occupation of Timor-Timur was the centre of attention.[1]

The sale was coordinated, under exclusion of the Indonesian parliament, by then technology minister and future president Baharuddin (B.J.) Habibie, who had excellent connections to the German weapons industry. The Indonesian weekly Tempo made the deal public, Kompas and DeTik joined in. In June 1994, Suharto simply outlawed the three magazines. This caused a lot of protests (on June 28, 1994). The police reacted violently. The controversial sale thus led to a further restriction of freedom of the press and freedom of assembly in Indonesia, while at the same time increasing criticism of Suharto’s regime. All of this, in turn, received coverage in the German media.

EU-ASEAN meeting of foreign ministers 1994 – No demonstration allowed

A few months later, Timor again made the headlines and a demonstration was not allowed. This time in Germany: in September 1994, in the city of Karlsruhe, the conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU and ASEAN countries took place. NGOs demanded a dialogue on human rights. But Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel announced in advance that he didn’t intend to bring up human rights. In response, the Greens in the European Parliament organised a conference and invited NGOs. East Timor was also on the agenda: José Amorim Dias, (Representative of the CNRM to the EU, Brussels) attended and participated in demonstrations NGOs organised, in tandem with Renato Constantino Jr. from the Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET).

A memorial vigil on the steps of the city’s church, situated only 20 metres from the City Hall, where the Ministers of Foreign Affairs signed the distinguished visitors’ book, was authorised by the City of Karlsruhe. But it was banned out of the blue, just before it was meant to start. The banners “Indonesia–19 Years of Genocide in East Timor” and “200.000 Dead in East Timor – why does Germany Export Weapons to Indonesia” were supposedly offensive.

Meanwhile, it became clear that the reaction of the city and police was an immediate response to the urging of the German Minster.[2] This drew more attention to the human rights violations in Indonesia and Timor than we could ever have achieved with a small demonstration. The Society for Threatened People later appealed the decision to ban the vigil and was found to be in the right.

1994: Conference “The European Responsibility for East Timor”

Conferences, initiated by Professor António Barbedo de Magalhaes of the University of Porto, were extremely important in strengthening networking and solidarity worldwide. These took place not only in Portugal, but also in Germany (1994), Australia (1996) and the US (1997), where they were organised in cooperation with local partners.

In cooperation with the Protestant Academy in Iserlohn and the Südostasien-Informationsstelle im Asienhaus (Southeast Asia Information Center at Asiahouse), an event entitled “European Responsibility for East Timor” was held at the end of October 1994. It created a platform for exchange and discussions involving East Timorese resistance, democracy and human rights activists from Indonesia, scholars, journalists and others (Ludwig 1994). It was very male dominated, as gender balance was not the focus at that time.

What was important, however, is that on the fringes of the conference, German activists came together and founded an East Timor solidarity group under the umbrella of the Berlin-based human rights organisation Watch Indonesia!

1995: Suharto arrives on a state visit – and faces massive protests

In 1995, Indonesia was nominated “partner country” of the Hannover Messe, one of the largest trade fairs in the world. It was expected that Suharto would attend. Indonesia was going to celebrate two anniversaries in 1995 – the 50th anniversary of Indonesia and thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Our task was to make public a third anniversary: 20 years of the occupation of East Timor.

Some 20 NGOs, including Amnesty International, Watch Indonesia! and its East Timor group, Asienhaus, Südostasien-Informationsstelle, IMBAS, BUKO and others, joined forces to send a strong signal by organising a whole series of activities and events the fair and the state visit (March 30 to April 2, 1995). The events culminated in a large demonstration protesting the massive human rights violations of the Suharto regime.

We, the East Timor group of Watch Indonesia!, had invited members of the Timorese resistance, Clandestinos of Renetil (National Resistance of East Timorese Students) and survivors of the Santa Cruz massacre living in exile in Portugal to join the protest: João Antonio Dias, witness of the killing of activists in the military hospital in Dili after the Santa Cruz Massacre; Aviano António da Silva Faria, Survivor of the Santa Cruz Massacre; Domingos Sarmento Alves, Luciano Valentim da Conceixo, Vitor Tavares and José Manual Oliveira da Sousa, members of Renetil among the 29 Timorese who occupied the US embassy in Jakarta during the APEC Summit in 1994. Indonesian activists such as Yeni Rosa Damayanti and pro-democracy scholars such as Sri Bintang Pamungkas were also invited to attend and speak at the events.

Together we managed to disrupt Suharto’s visit. The Timorese protest therefore not only took place in his capital Jakarta, as it had the year before at the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit, but now also in Germany.

After the protests in Hannover, we toured Germany for two weeks with João Antonio Dias, Aviano Antonio da Silva Faria and Domingos Sarmento Alves. Every evening there were events in different cities, mostly in cooperation with Amnesty International. We sought contact with representatives of political foundations and church organisations, approached politicians and the media. These meetings had a great impact, together we were able to open many doors. The opportunity to meet with representatives from East Timor and get first-hand information was extremely important in in engaging people to support the just cause of Timor.[3]

Suharto and his entourage: Not welcome in Dresden and Weimar

Another group of our guests, Luciano Valentim da Conceição, Vitor Tavares and José Manual Oliveira da Sousa followed Suharto to the eastern part of Germany. In Dresden, Suharto was loudly welcomed by a crowd of about 150 people beating drums and waving posters. The protest was organised by two German organisations (Wolfspelz and Timor und kein Trupp), which spoke out against Germany’s economic and military cooperation with Indonesia due to human rights violations.

A planned visit of Suharto at the Dresden Opera House could not be realised, because the orchestra refused to perform for the Indonesian president. Some parties in the regional parliament (including the Greens, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the PDS (democratic socialists) signed a joint statement declaring him unwelcome in Dresden. They cited the killing of at least half a million people when Suharto came to power in 1965 and the invasion of East Timor in 1975, among other atrocities. The mayor of Weimar refused to receive him. This was due to the Zeitgeist. Six years after the peaceful revolution which led to the end of the GDR, people still believed in the power of the people and in creative ways to express this.

The protests infuriated Suharto. In search of scapegoats, he had indictments brought against Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Yeni Rosa Damayanti and Goenawan Mohamad on the charge of subversion. On May 8, 1996, Sri Bintang was sentenced to thirty-four months’ imprisonment for “insulting the president” based on remarks he had made in 1995 during a lecture at the Technische Universität Berlin in Germany.[4]

The increasing number of political prisoners and the harsh measures taken to suppress advocates of civil liberties led to a politicisation of the population and building of solidarity among those affected. In Germany, both the demonstrations and the backlash in Indonesia attracted attention: in the media and the parliament, among the opposition parties and the human rights community.

A few years later, the decline of the New Order regime in Indonesia would be the subject of political science research on the power of human rights, based on the following thesis: “Once transnational advocacy networks emerge and develop a powerful mobilising frame, governments that violate human rights are prompted to make tactical concessions. Furthermore, these tactical concessions provide opportunities for domestic actors to mobilise, and this mobilisation will elicit more comprehensive reforms” (Jetschke 1999: 132).

1996: Nobel Peace Prize attracts new level of attention

In particular, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the representatives of East Timor in 1996 had an enormous influence on the perception of the conflict in Germany. For the first time, the German government was willing to hold direct talks with Timorese representatives. After the award ceremony in Oslo, both honoured laureates, Bishop Carlos Belo and José Ramos-Horta, came to Germany. According to confidential reports, Chancellor Kohl told Bishop Belo that an independent East Timor was out of the question, but that he would use his influence to encourage Suharto to think about a special status, a kind of autonomy for Indonesia’s 27th province, Timor-Timur.

The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize brought East Timor into the public eye in an unprecedented way – for a short time. A year later, the people’s hopes of a dialogue with the Indonesian government faded. It became clear that “a Nobel Peace Prize was not enough to bring about peace”.[5]

The people of East Timor needed more than just congratulations for being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize: they needed a political commitment that would urge the Indonesian government to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. How could this be achieved? How could we get this message across and use and maintain the attention of the media? First, with a strong public awareness campaign. Second, with focused lobbying and advocacy work.

1997 Campaign: Raise your Voice on behalf of East Timor

Together with NGOs against Arms Trade and faith-based organisations, we initiated the campaign “Raise Your Voice on Behalf of East Timor”. On Dec. 7, 1997, we invited Christian communities to send Christmas cards to Bishop Belo, on behalf of the people in East Timor and to protest strongly against the German arms trade to Indonesia.

On 7 December 1997, ecumenical prayers were said in many churches in Germany for the people of East Timor. More than 8,500 people sent Christmas cards to Bishop Belo. Numerous Catholic and Protestant congregations and communities, ecumenical and peace initiatives, aid and welfare organisations had joined the campaign. We sent an open letter to Chancellor Helmut Kohl and letters to all members of the Bundestag and publicised the campaign further with a large newspaper advertisement. We collected the cards and in spring 1998, when Bishop Belo was in Germany as a guest of MISEREOR for the opening of the Lenten campaign, we met him and presented him with the cards.

The postcards to Bishop Belo contained the following text:

1998/1999: Change in Indonesia – opportunity for conflict resolution in East Timor

With regard to our lobbying and advocacy work, Watch Indonesia! together with church relief and human rights organisations, like MISEREOR, Diakonia and missio had initiated a political dialogue on Indonesia and East Timor. It was hosted by the German Peace and Justice Commission. We regularly invited parliamentarians, representatives of the ministries and political foundations to discuss current developments and options for action. It became obvious that a change of the political landscape in Indonesia was the basis for a conflict resolution in East Timor and a democratisation of Indonesia.

In May 1998, during the financial crisis, Suharto was forced to step down. “Although the financial crisis accelerated the decline in power, its actual cause was largely due to the campaigns of national and international human rights organisations, which had increasingly de-legitimised Suharto’s regime”, explains political scientist Thomas Risse (2001). His research colleague Anja Jetschke (1999: 160) adds: “They had nourished a deep-seated crisis of legitimacy and had managed to transform to an unprecedented extent the picture of the country from one of political stability coupled with economic expertise and steady growth rates, to one of lack of public accountability, systematic human rights violations, and corruption. Suharto’s international reputation had been effectively questioned by transnational networks (…).”

East Timor matters!

In 1998, and even more so in 1999, East Timor was no longer a blind spot: not in the eyes of human rights and faith-based organisations, not in the eyes of the public and the media. And there was also more critical awareness in parliament and in the new government.[7] In 1998, Helmut Kohl and the Christian Democratic (conservative) Party were voted out of office and the Social Democrats and the Greens were elected to government.

In April 1999, a delegation from the German Bundestag visited Timor-Timur. While they were holding talks with officials in Dili, militias backed by the Indonesian military committed a massacre in the church of Liquiça. They strongly urged the German government to support the United Nations in resolving the conflict. “In order to prevent further bloodshed and a political-military escalation, a UN peacekeeping mission should be considered after a locally negotiated ceasefire if the Indonesian government continues to fail to fulfil its responsibility to protect the population.”[8]

On the occasion of the referendum in East Timor in 1999, 10 people from Germany took part in the IFET-OP – the observer project of the International Federation for East Timor. As eyewitnesses, they gave numerous interviews to the media. The terror in Timor dominated the media headlines at the time. Together with the news media, we succeeded in raising public awareness and putting pressure on our government (Schlicher 2004).

The government of Germany was late in getting involved in East-Timor, and it was not decisively active on the front line: The attitudes towards Indonesia that had been anchored in the foreign ministry for decades were too strong for a new stance to be adopted within a short time. High-ranking representatives of the Foreign Ministry admitted at a public event that they had been taken by surprise by the militia terror in Timor. The German embassy and the department responsible for Indonesia believed in the authority of President Habibie, our “German boy”, and once again overlooked the power of the military. Since the time of the UN transitional administration in 1999, Timor-Leste has received extensive support from Germany to rebuild the country. Germany was a partner in Timor-Leste’s development cooperation until 2023.

Timor matters! Because the people of Timor-Leste stood up strongly and firmly for their rights. Because human rights matter – wherever they are violated. And because it is the task of civil society worldwide to put pressure on their governments to respect these rights. The solidarity with Timor-Leste was an impressive experience that no one could escape.

East Timor in independence: new challenges – partnership in solidarity with civil society

Timor-Leste has been out of focus again in Germany for some time now. In the first decade after independence, humanitarian crisis, reconstruction, UN missions, post-conflict and development challenges as well as transitional justice received a lot of attention in politics, in the work of aid organisations and NGOs, in academia and in the media. Today, the country is no longer perceived as fragile, it has emerged from a deep political crisis and assessments attest to a good level of democracy. Other wars, humanitarian crises and centres of conflict around the world have moved into the spotlight and are demanding political attention.

Nevertheless, there is support for Timor-Leste in Germany: for instance, MISEREOR, the German bishops’ aid organisation for development cooperation, supports numerous project partnerships and AGIAMONDO is involved in Timor-Leste with experts from the Civil Peace Service.[9] At the Stiftung Asienhaus, we raise public awareness of development and human rights issues in Timor-Leste. Compared to the time before 1999, our work today is much more strongly based on partnership-based cooperation with civil society organisations and a lively exchange.

The country’s remarkable achievements in the field of democracy and peacebuilding are indeed impressive. It has been an enormous challenge to get to this point. It is the result of the strength and hard work of the East Timorese people. And undoubtedly, much remains to be done to further strengthen the country’s democratic and economic development and build a just society.

A vibrant civil society is essential for democratic development. In Timor-Leste, civil society has always been a great force committed to nation-building. “The spirit that united the young activists in the past was the yearning for independence. Now they are united by their desire to develop Timor-Leste towards the common good in a constructive way”, says Rui Muakandala, Director of Casa Produsaun Audiovisual, recognising the socio-political commitment. Today’s young generation is also effectively involved in civil society organisations and is contributing to change and development in Timor-Leste (Schlicher and Tschanz 2019a).

“At the time of the occupation, our dream was to be free. We have achieved that. Social equality is my dream for the future,” says Adelia Guterres. The former resistance fighter is now committed to conflict prevention, women, peace and security at government level. Her vision for the future is that women who have been victims of human rights violations will finally receive justice. She is thinking, for example, of those women whose partners fought in Falintil (Timor-Leste Armed Forces of National Liberation) and who were therefore captured, imprisoned, tortured and raped by the Indonesian military. It was not uncommon that they were forced to marry their abusers. “In the past, they became victims of human rights violations, after independence, they became victims again. They went through condemnations and violations by the behaviour of the government, society, their family and community. These women have contributed enormously to liberation. It would be a healing process for them to receive understanding in return” (Schlicher and Tschanz 2019a).

Gender-based violence, especially domestic violence, is still a serious problem and social, patriarchal hierarchies continue to dominate (Pereira 2020).[10] It is not only women and girls who are affected by sexualised violence, and the church is a part of the strong patriarchal structures that are socio-politically dominant in Timor-Leste.

In 2002, Mgr. Belo, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996, resigned as bishop. The reason given was exhaustion. He now lives in Portugal. In September 2022, the Dutch magazine De Groene Amsterdammer reported that Belo had sexually abused several boys in the 1990s.[11] The Holy See Press Office then announced that the Vatican had already imposed restrictions in 2019 due to “accusations it received concerning the bishop’s behaviour”. The sanctions were tightened in November 2021. These relate to restrictions on the bishop’s freedom of movement and the exercise of his ministry, as well as a ban on “voluntary contact” with minors and Timor-Leste. “Monsignor Belo has formally accepted the measures.”[12]

The reactions in Timor-Leste were similar to those in many other parts of the world where society was confronted with allegations of abuse in the church for the first time: silence – denial – looking the other way – trivialisation. For many, paedophilia is at best a trivial offense. This attitude is also encouraged by the country’s leading political representatives, who do not want to question the merits of priests in the struggle for independence. There is still a lot of work to be done to ensure that victims come forward and receive justice.

This also raises the question of how we can talk about our solidarity campaigns for Bishop Belo during the resistance without ignoring the victims?

Sexualised violence and abuse are crimes that take place around the world, including Germany. One of our tasks at Stiftung Asienhaus is to amplify civil society perspectives from Timor-Leste. In September 2023, we had two project managers from ACbit – Assosiasaun Chega! Ba It and Casa Produsaun Audiovisual visited us in Cologne.[13] The feminist women’s rights and aid organiation medica mondiale, which campaigns worldwide to end sexualised violence, was very interested in hearing about their experiences. The guests also benefited from the contact with the Institut für Prävention und Aufarbeitung von sexualisierter Gewalt (Institute for the Prevention and Reappraisal of Sexualized Violence). The Institute is a competence centre for work on prevention and dealing with sexual violence in institutions with the aim of bundling and further developing the experience gained in Germany within and outside the church in this sensitive topic area.

The issues are different today than they were before 1999, but the solidarity remains and lives on.