South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994 was preceded by a decades-long liberation struggle fought in and outside the country. Nelson Mandela who is also called after his isiXhosa clan name, Madiba, became South Africa’s first democratically elected president and served in this position from 1994 until 1999. A high-ranking official of the African National Congress (ANC), Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964 on counts of, inter alia, sabotage against the apartheid government. Mandela’s sentencing followed the banning of the ANC and another liberation movement, the Pan-Africanist Congress, on 8 April 1960. The apartheid government unbanned the ANC in 1990, released political prisoners and initiated formal negotiations for a democratic transition. Mandela was released on 12 February 1990 and elected South Africa’s first democratic president in 1994.

After its liberation struggle, the ANC continued to maintain its historical support for liberation movements across the globe. It had supported and expressed solidarity with liberation movements in, for example, Algeria, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and was a strong supporter of Cuba, the Polisario Front and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) (ANC 1982; 1985; 1986). A less known fact is the ANC’s – both as a liberation movement and as governing party – relations with East Timor and Indonesia. The role of Mandela in the liberation struggle of East Timor has also not received significant scholarly attention.

Democratic transition in South Africa inspired solidarity and involvement in various peace initiatives in Africa and elsewhere; particularly in Palestine, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) and East Timor. Besides declared certain commonalities with other liberation struggles.[1] transition has also inspired the peace and independence movement in East Timor (Wise 2006: 79-80).

Despite these commitments and inspiration, the involvement of President Mandela and his government in the East Timorese peace process has not been uncomplicated as will be outlined below. Therefore, this contribution sheds light on this neglected aspect of the life and presidential tenure of Mandela, the ANC’s relations with Indonesia, and East Timor’s struggle for self-determination. The chapter outlines efforts and diplomatic initiatives to achieve peace in East Timor, particularly focusing on Mandela’s presidential tenure from 1994 to 1999. Thus, it refers to East Timor rather than the official name of the country, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste or Timor-Leste, which occurred when it joined the United Nations (UN) in 2002. Given the main theme of the book and other work on, what the UN termed, the Question of East Timor (Benzing 2005),[2] the chapter does not provide a comprehensive historical outline and analysis of the East Timor crisis. However, for contextual purposes, some historical references do occur.

The coup in Portugal in 1974 resulted in the decolonisation process of the country’s colonies, including East Timor. Several political parties with divergent views of the colony’s future were formed shortly after the coup. Their differences resulted in a civil war in 1975 from which Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste) – successor of the Timorese Social Democratic Association (Associação Social Democrática Timor, ASDT) – emerged victorious. The ADST changed its name and approach in 1974: “ASDT was formed to defend the idea of the right to independence: Fretilin was formed to fight for independence” (Benzing 2005: 301). On 28 November 1975, Fretilin declared independence and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of East Timor. However, on 7 December 1975, the Indonesian military invaded East Timor. Despite the UN protesting the invasion and occupation, Indonesia declared East Timor its 27th province on 17 July 1976; a development not recognised by the UN that regarded Portugal as the administrator of the region (Benzing 2005: 301-302; Amnesty International, 1997: 3). East Timorese resistance against Indonesia increased as Fretilin waged an armed struggle to achieve independence. José Alexandre ‘Xanana’ Gusmão as leader of Fretilin attracted attention and, on 20 November 1992, was captured by Indonesian forces, put on trial and sentenced to life imprisonment. This, however, did not end the East Timorese struggle for self-determination. By the time South Africa transitioned to democracy in the 1990s, the conflict in East Timor had been called the “forgotten conflict” (Sejersted 1996) and later described as a case of “delayed decolonisation” (Benzing 2005: 297) due to little or no progress on its resolution under the auspices of the UN.

The chapter proceeds with the ANC’s historical concerns about and expressions of solidarity with the people of East Timor and Fretilin. Then, it reflects on the historical and post-1990 relations between Indonesia and the ANC. After this section, the chapter focuses on Mandela’s role in the East Timor peace process by referring to his call for the release of Gusmão, his meeting with him, and the president’s diplomatic efforts and engagements with East Timorese leaders, Portugal and Suharto. Finally, it outlines South Africa’s engagement with the UN on the self-determination of East Timor, as well as some of the developments after Mandela left office.

The ANC and East Timor

The East Timor liberation struggle was not unknown to the ANC. For example, its 1982 annual January 8 Statement (which commemorates the establishment of the ANC in 1912), declared:

The Statement of 1983 also mentioned East Timor and its ‘vanguard organisation’, Fretilin (ANC, 1983) and in 1985 the ANC January 8 Statement read: “We salute all people engaged in struggle for national liberation, especially El Salvador and East Timor” (ANC 1985).

These expressions of support and solidarity with East Timor and Fretilin continued, albeit not annually (ANC 1986). In 1987, the ANC referred to Fretilin as one of its “allies…who are fighting for their genuine national emancipation and the consolidation of their independence” (ANC 1987). By 1992 when the negotiations for a democratic South Africa was underway, the ANC reiterated its ‘solidarity with the people of East Timor and elsewhere in their struggle for national self-determination’ (ANC 1992).

East Timor expressed similar sentiments regarding South African liberation struggle and the ANC, notably in 1994 when Mandela became South Africa’s first post-apartheid president on 9 May 1994. A few days after, on 15 May, Gusmão sent a letter congratulating the South African president on the end of apartheid and his election. Gusmão (in Wise 2006: 79-80) wrote of the inspiration drawn from the South African liberation struggle stating that the oppressed people of East Timor had been encouraged even more to make the sacrifices needed to defend their rights, uphold freedom and justice, and attain peace. Gusmão also reiterated that South Africa’s liberation could not be complete if there remained oppressed people across the world.

The letter had a significant impact on Mandela (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2024). Like him, Gusmão had been imprisoned for his involvement in a liberation struggle. Mandela took up the Timorese liberation cause and established close relations with Gusmão as a fellow political prisoner and as a human rights campaigner. Mandela and the ANC were also mindful of their “similar history”.[3] In 1998, the ruling party referred to its undertaking to

Despite the goodwill and similarities between Gusmão and Mandela, the South African president and his party had maintained close relations with the Indonesian president Suharto, who ruled from 1967-1998. This period overlaps mostly with the ANC’s banning and the organisation’s first term as the democratically elected ruling party. Besides this, Indonesia has historically been an influential leader in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) since it was established in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. The NAM as a collective was also an ardent supporter of the ANC as a liberation movement; an aspect that, as the next section outlines, the ANC as governing party intended to recognise and balance since the ANC was unbanned in 1990.

The ANC and Indonesia

During the 1600s, people of what is today known as Indonesia were brought as slaves to the Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope. Besides these historical connections, Indonesia supported the ANC financially and ideologically for decades. Although the ANC expressed its solidarity with East Timor and Fretilin in successive January 8 Statements, it never referred to or criticised Indonesia and Suharto – who were generous financial supporters of the ANC – for its role in the East Timorese conflict (ANC 1982; 1985; 1986; 1987; 1992 and 1998). In 1990, for example, Mandela, after his release from prison, accepted a “substantial financial donation” to his party from the Indonesian government (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2024). He made a private goodwill visit to Indonesia in July 1994 and in May 1995, like before, reiterated Indonesia’s generous support of the ANC (Guelke 2000: 189). In 1997, Mandela visited Indonesia twice. During his second visit, in July 1997, he alluded to the historical ties and, again, recognised Indonesia’s support:

Critics warned against ANC links with controversial and undemocratic President Suharto stating that they were detrimental to the organisation’s democratic credentials. South African parliamentarians boycotted the national day celebrations hosted by the Indonesian ambassador to South Africa (Marker 2003: 58). Criticism against Indonesia’s financial donations to the ANC also did not abate (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2024). When in government, Mandela’s office justified the donations as it enabled the party to participate in South Africa’s democratic transition.[5]

Following the official visit to Indonesia in July 1997, Mandela confirmed that South Africa would export arms to Indonesia; a matter that, according to opposition parties and trade unions, ran counter to the country’s human rights foreign policy and contradicted Mandela’s peace efforts regarding East Timor.[6] Moreover, relations between a bank with close ties to Suharto, Bank Putera Sukapura, and a South African non-governmental organisation, Foundation for Peace and Justice, led by ANC stalwart Alan Boesak deteriorated when the latter misappropriated funds donated by the Indonesian bank. Following this, Mandela made his second visit to Indonesia in July 1997 to mend fences between the two countries and the ruling elite (Guelke 2000: 189).

Mandela’s call for the release of and meeting with Gusmão

Mandela’s official state visit to Indonesia in July 1997 was significant. Besides Mandela (1997a) repeating his party’s gratitude to Indonesia and Suharto for their support of the ANC, he also raised the question of East Timor and Gusmão’s release from prison (Marker 2003: 59). More importantly, in a letter to his Indonesian counterpart before his return to South Africa, Mandela requested Suharto to meet with Gusmão (Marker 2003: 59): “You will understand that we cannot normalise the situation in East Timor unless and the political leaders, including Mr Gusmão, are free” (Amnesty International 1997: 1). Suharto initially refused Mandela’s unprecedented request,[7] but on 15 July 1997 at State Guest House, not in prison, Mandela met with Gusmão. He detailed his meeting with Mandela in a letter to his wife, Kirsty Sword Gusmão.[8] The South African president told how he requested Suharto to meet with him, which was initially refused. Mandela insisted that, due to the demands from human rights organisations in South Africa, he could not miss the opportunity to meet with the liberation fighter. Mandela also told Gusmão how he explained to his counterpart that, during his incarceration as a political prisoner, he received visitors from abroad and officials from the apartheid government. The South African President is said to have requested Gusmão to consider ending the armed struggle as it gave the Indonesian government even more reason to attack East Timor. However, Gusmão was not keen to negotiate with the Indonesian government (Marker 2003: 59). Gusmão reiterated that he was keen to enter dialogue with Suharto government unconditionally but blamed the government of not being eager to enter talks.

In November 1997, Mandela requested Indonesia’s permission to dispatch foreign minister, Alfred Nzo, to meet with Gusmão “as part of the South African effort to help Indonesia in settling the East Timor issue” within the UN framework (Niner, 2015: 283). Nzo, and his Director General, Jakes Gerwel, met Gusmão on 14 April 1998 at Cipinang prison. Nzo also met with Suharto conveying Mandela’s request to speed up Gusmão’s release (Niner, 2015: 283). Indonesia rejected the proposal for Timorese independence and proposed autonomy for East Timor. However, the reaction to the South African proposal to release Gusmão was lukewarm but, if agreed, it should occur within the framework of the UN-sponsored process that included Indonesia and Portugal. The former colonial power also supported this condition for Gusmão’s release (NMF, 2024). Following Nzo’s meeting with Gusmão, the Indonesian Justice Minister declared: “Political detainees are certain to draw international interest. That is, if internationally, Xanana is seen as a political prisoner. We see him as a common criminal” (in Niner 2015: 283).

The significance of Mandela’s dinner with Gusmão had been wide-ranging. Years later Gusmão admitted that he drew inspiration from Mandela while imprisoned.[9] During the dinner, Mandela told him “I support your struggle” but, that as a mediator, he needed to remain neutral. Mandela’s request to Suharto allayed concerns about South Africa’s abandonment of its human rights based foreign policy. Mandela and Gusmão seemed to have clicked from the start. Both men formed a bond based on their commonalities as incarcerated political prisoners and liberation fighters. Mandela (in Arthur 2019: 162) was impressed with Gusmão and later described him as “one of the most impressive people” that he has ever met. He also expressed his appreciation of Gusmão’s “intelligence and decisiveness”, but the South African questioned the efficacy of the Timorese armed struggle as it provided the Indonesian government with an excuse to “slaughter people” (Marker 2003: 59-60). Mandela also observed that he was “struck by his [Gusmão’s] outstanding qualities, his commitment to principles”[10] whereas Gusmão (1997) observed Mandela’s keen interest in the East Timorese conflict. Mandela undertook to continue his diplomatic engagements with Suharto for the release of Gusmão and all other Timorese political prisoners. Moreover, the major significance of the dinner was that the East Timorese question was catapulted onto the international stage, particularly due to Mandela’s stature, and it also enhanced Gusmão’s stature as a leader resulting in the moniker for him as “the Timorese Mandela” (Blanco 2020: 71). The meeting ushered in a series of visits by ambassadors, religious leaders, journalists, businessmen, solidarity activists and military officials from Indonesia and around the world to the imprisoned leader (Tiffen 2001: 52). Notwithstanding this, the road to the self-determination of East Timor was still a long way ahead but the intense diplomatic involvement of Mandela during 1997 re-energised the process.

Mandela’s diplomatic efforts to engage East Timor and Indonesia

Soon after the visit to Indonesia and meetings with Suharto and Gusmão, Mandela embarked on further diplomatic efforts to achieve peace in East Timor. First, South Africa’s declared support for East Timorese independence continued. Second, Mandela engaged with both parties to the conflict by inviting East Timorese stakeholders and Suharto, to South Africa. For example, Mandela met with exiled East Timorese José Ramos-Horta in July 1997[11] – both were Nobel Peace Laureates; and Suharto was invited to visit South Africa in November 1997. A third strategy Mandela applied was to engage Portugal, party to the negotiating process under the auspices of the UN, having met with President Jorge Sampaio.[12]

Diplomatic engagements and tensions

The contradictions between South Africa’s ruling party’s declared support of East Timor and the ANC’s close ties with Suharto government persisted. In September 1996, the ANC invited a Fretilin delegation to South Africa. Mandela told the delegation that, despite Indonesia’s generous support of the ANC, South Africa would not be kept hostage by this. In contrast, South Africa subsequently abstained on resolutions regarding Indonesian violence against the Timorese at the UN Human Rights Commission in 1997 and 1998 (Guelke 2000: 189; Baker and Lyman 2009: 271).

Engagements with Suharto, whom Mandela described as a “close friend”, had also been significant as the leaders had met on several occasions and remained in contact. However, this was not appreciated by Portugal and a diplomatic row between both countries erupted when Mandela’s office delivered a letter from the president, dated 22 July 1997, to his Indonesian counterpart to the embassy of Portugal to South Africa in Pretoria, rather than to the Indonesian embassy. It remains unclear why the letter was delivered to the Portuguese embassy, but the ambassador, Vasco Valente, did not return the letter to Mandela’s office or forward it to Suharto. Instead, Valente forwarded it to his principals in Portugal. Suharto only received the letter on 1 August 1997.[13] The leaked letter was significant because Mandela explained that Gusmão “could be pivotal in the search for peace” and asked Suharto to consider releasing him without conditions (Nelson Mandela Foundation 2024), also emphasising the imperative to embark on a negotiating process.[14]

Once details of the leaked letter emerged, Mandela was insistent that the ambassador be expelled and wrote to Suharto on 5 August 1997 that he was

In response to the diplomatic incident, Portugal’s president, Jorge Sampaio, met with Mandela in Pretoria towards the end of July 1997. Sampaio praised Mandela’s for his initiative on East Timor but was clearly mindful of the diplomatic incident. Mandela was also cautious in his comments after meeting his Portuguese counterpart, saying the leaders discussed

However, South Africa expelled the Portuguese ambassador. Valente’s expulsion was the first expulsion by the new ANC-led government since it came to office[16] and thus also showed greater South African confidence on the international stage. Mandela was also clear that “a solution in East Timor is not something that can be achieved by people outside East Timor. The leaders of East Timor and the Indonesian government are the people who are going to solve this matter”.[17]

Besides engaging Suharto, Mandela continued diplomatic contacts which included meeting high-profile individuals from East Timor. In September 1997, he invited Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, prominent Timorese leader and co-Nobel Peace Laureate (with Ramos-Horta in 1996), to South Africa to brief him on South Africa’s efforts in support of the Secretary-General’s initiatives on East Timor. Mandela also declared that he proposed to Suharto that East Timor should be given autonomy[18] and joined other international voices as one of the Nobel Laureates that wrote an open letter to Suharto appealing for the Indonesian president’s leadership and support of initiatives to resolve the conflict in East Timor and find a “just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution”.[19]

Engagement with the UN

Mandela invited Suharto to visit South Africa in November 1997. UNSG Kofi Annan and his Personal Representative for East Timor, Jamsheed Marker, used the visit to make progress with the UN process on East Timor. Prior to Suharto’s visit, Annan contacted Mandela to impress upon him the importance of the involvement of Gusmão in the negotiating process and suggested to insist on Suharto commencing direct secret talks with Gusmão, without disrupting the official talks between Indonesia and Portugal under the Secretary-General’s auspices (Marker 2003: 66).

As the date of Suharto’s visit approached, Mandela met Annan’s envoy, Jamsheed Marker, on 27 August 1997 in Pretoria. Mandela shared details of his meetings with Suharto and Gusmão and requested the envoy to convey to Annan South Africa’s continued peace efforts in East Timor (Marker 2003: 59). Mandela reiterated that he appealed Suharto to release Gusmão but again acknowledged Indonesia’s support to the ANC and the South African liberation struggle. The South African government also stated

Mandela informed Marker of some of the bi and multilateral issues, including the issue of East Timor, that would be discussed with Suharto during the forthcoming state visit, and told that he would brief his Indonesian counterpart on his meetings with Portuguese President Sampaio, Ramos-Horta and Bishop Belo since July 1997. They also discussed the possibility of Gusmão’s release from prison and possible exile to South Africa and Mandela suggested a conference, with UN participation, of East Timorese leaders in South Africa. Writing on his experience as UN envoy, Marker (2003: 59-61) said that he cautioned against the “explosive implications” of the idea as Suharto was due to visit South Africa. According to another report, Mandela offered to host “ongoing talks between Indonesia’s regime and exiled East Timor activists”; an initiative Marker has been said to commend, stating: “The political impetus that has been given to this process now is extremely important and it is something that we in the United Nations intend to develop and to maintain the momentum that has taken place so far”.[21]

Marker was also reported to praise Mandela for his “important contributions that has given great impetus to the ongoing negotiations”.[22] The envoy relayed details of his meeting suggesting that close contact should be maintained with Mandela and that he should be kept informed of the Secretary-General’s initiatives. Moreover, the envoy suggested that the Secretary-General “conserve the immense prestige of his [Mandela’s] authority for the moment it could be most effectively deployed during the future course of negotiation” (Marker 2003: 61). By the time the special envoy visited Gusmão in prison he had changed mind and prepared to accept political asylum in South Africa to organise his political campaign (Marker 2003: 70).

Suharto’s visit to South Africa

During Suharto’s visit to South Africa in November 1997, drew on the historical parallels between South Africa and Indonesia and referred to both countries’ efforts to find peaceful solutions for domestic questions, reiterating his personal and South Africa’s willingness to “lend a helping hand where such may be requited, within the context of multilateral institutions”. South Africa also recognised Suharto’s support of the South African liberation struggle and awarded him the country’s highest award, the Order of Good Hope.[23] Money, however, continued to play a particularly significant role in the relations between the countries. Besides Indonesia’s financial donations to the ANC, South Africa’s trade with Indonesia grew substantially since the ANC took power, and, by 1997, amounted to R1.43 billion in South Africa’s favour.[24] Post-apartheid South Africa declared human rights to be a major foundation of its foreign policy; a matter that often arose around South Africa’s arms sales to Indonesia.

Continued engagement in United Nations context

After Suharto’s state visit to South Africa, Mandela briefed the UNSG, insisting that the East Timor issue and particularly Gusmão’s release were global concerns and could disrupt the cohesion of the NAM during the organisation’s following meeting when South Africa would take over its leadership. Although Suharto did not make any commitments to Mandela, the South African reported that his counterpart was not completely indisposed of the idea (Marker 2003: 66). Despite these seemingly positive developments, Suharto did not release Gusmão. Meanwhile, foreign minister Ali Alatas stepped in to liaise with the international community with some resistance to proposals made in the context of the talks under the UN’s auspices (Marker 2003: 66-68). Suharto resigned on 21 May 1998. Mandela’s presidential tenure ended in mid-1999 when Thabo Mbeki succeeded him. Gusmão was released from prison a few months later having served seven years of his prison sentence.

On 30 August 1999, East Timorese voted overwhelmingly in a referendum in favour of independence. With this, Indonesian occupation of the territory came to an end and ushered in a period of democratic transition led by the UN. The UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) was established on 25 October 1999 to administer the territory, exercise legislative and executive authority, and to support capacity building during the region’s transition towards independence.[25] South Africa did not contribute military personnel or civilian police personnel to UNTAET;[26] only towards the end of 1999, a group of 40 South African bodyguards set off to protect Gusmão in Dili after he requested President Thabo Mbeki for protection.[27]

Xanana Gusmão met with Mandela and President Mbeki in South Africa in March 2000. It was Gusmão’s first meeting with Mandela since 1997. He thanked South Africa for its support during the Timorese liberation struggle and requested support of the transition. Gusmão stated that the Indonesian military should stop assisting the anti-independence militias in East Timor and requested South African support for the development of Timorese human resources. Mbeki confirmed that South Africa had already agreed to the UN’s request for the country to assist in the rebuilding of public service and police, that it would continue to support East Timor during and beyond its transition to independence, and that it would engage with the Indonesian government on disarmament and security issues.[28] Mbeki also undertook to engage with the European Union (EU) on its slow delivery of support to East Timor during the upcoming EU-Africa Summit in April 2000.

Gusmão won the presidential election of April 2002. Following the election, South Africa established full diplomatic ties with the newly independent state, and, on 3 February 2003, South Africa and Timor-Leste signed a Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. But also on 20 May 2002, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) came into operation to assist in the establishment of administrative structures to achieve, inter alia, political stability in East Timor. South Africa did not contribute to it,[29] possibly because Mandela’s presidential tenure had ended earlier in 1999.

During its tenure as a Non-Permanent Member of the UN Security Council in 2007/8, South Africa was designated as the Lead Nation on Timor-Leste. This required South Africa to follow developments regarding Timor-Leste, consult with all relevant parties (e.g. Brazil, Portugal, Indonesia, Australia and Malaysia), and draft all Security Council resolutions and statements regarding Timor-Leste. South Africa was also invited as an observer to the elections in Timor-Leste during this period and assisted with nation building and the development of democratic institutions in the newly independent state.[30]

Upon the death of Mandela, the government of Timor-Leste declared a National Day of Mourning in his honour.[31] Now Prime Minister, Gusmão (in Ntshingila 2016: 106) expressed the country’s condolences and led a delegation to South Africa to attend the funeral. He reiterated the role of Mandela and South Africa in Timor-Leste’s independence stating that during the country’s “greatest times of need”, Mandela “reached out his hand in friendship, demonstrating political support and solidarity, for which we are and will forever remain eternally grateful”. Gusmão also referred to Mandela’s visit to him in prison in 1997 producing “a crucial international momentum to Timor-Leste’s struggle for independence”.[32]

In 2017, South Africa awarded the Order of the Companions of Oliver Tambo to Gusmão. The award recognises eminent foreign nationals for their friendship towards South Africa and is regarded as an Order of “peace, cooperation and active expression of solidarity and support”.[33] Gusmão was recognised for his exceptional contribution to the promotion of peace and resistance to social injustices (Republic of South Africa 2018: 45).

At the Nelson Mandela Peace Summit in 2018, the foreign minister of Timor-Leste, Dionisio Babo Soares, acknowledged Mandela’s significant diplomatic and inspirational role in the Timorese struggle for independence.[34] Mandela’s international stature, the parallels between the men and increased international awareness of the East Timorese question added to the focus on Gusmão that earned him the moniker the “Mandela of Southeast Asia” (Wise 2006: 80).[35]

Conclusion

South Africa has been linked to Timor-Leste and Indonesia historically. Besides the colonial period and its associated slavery, South Africa’s links to these states are also of a more contemporary nature. As a liberation movement, the ANC repeatedly stressed its support of and solidarity with the East Timorese independence struggle. The ANC has also emphasised its strong bonds with Indonesia as the leader of the NAM and received ideological and financial support from Indonesia for decades. Seemingly, the ANC never criticised Indonesia for its occupation of East Timor, instead framing it as a liberation or independence struggle. Despite this, the ANC as a liberation movement and, since 1994, as the ruling party seemed to balance its interests regarding both East Timor and Indonesia. In this respect, Mandela played a significant role.

Like the anti-apartheid struggle in and outside South Africa, the involvement of an international figure such as Mandela brought another international dimension to Timor-Leste’s drive for national self-determination. This, however, was not without challenges and controversy. During Mandela’s presidential term, South Africa sold arms to Indonesia; a matter that seemingly ran counter to Mandela’s efforts to support Xanana Gusmão’s release. Soon after his release from prison, Mandela travelled to Indonesia to express gratitude for the country’s support. On a subsequent visit to Indonesia, Mandela made an unconventional request to his counterpart, i.e. to meet with the East Timorese liberation fighter, Gusmão. Suharto gave permission for the meeting; an event that caught the attention of the international community. Mandela’s international stature added gravitas to the persona of Gusmão and the East Timorese struggle.

Sharing a common history with Gusmão, Mandela eagerly became engaged with calls for his release and a negotiated settlement for an independent East Timor. Mandela was also mindful of the criticism against his party and government for maintaining strong bonds with Suharto. Moreover, the South African president was already engaged in various peace processes in Africa; an issue which countered criticism against Mandela government’s declared human rights foreign policy. Mandela was also mindful of the negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal on East Timor under the auspices of the UN and reiterated that his initiatives were in support of that of the UN. He was also aware that the UN process excluded East Timor, Fretilin and Gusmão.

Mandela proceeded to follow several diplomatic strategies in advancing the cause of East Timor and the release of Gusmão. Bilaterally, he engaged Suharto on the release of Gusmão and the imperative to start negotiations between the Indonesian government and Fretilin. He also engaged with Portugal regarding its role. The diplomatic incident regarding Mandela’s letter to Suharto that involved the Portuguese could be read as a colonial master’s attempts to maintain its influence. Mandela also had to maintain the trust of Suharto. Simultaneously, he actively engaged with East Timorese in exile and remaining in the region by inviting them to South Africa for talks. He was thus able to sustain a network of diplomatic and non-state actors and interests in these engagements. Besides this, Mandela was also astute in working with the UNSG and his Personal Representative for East Timor. He was concerned about Gusmão’s welfare and conditions in prison, as well as his position on the armed struggle and negotiations with the Indonesian government. In this regard, the leaders kept in touch via East Timorese visiting Mandela who also dispatched his foreign minister to meet with Gusmão.

Mandela was mindful of Indonesia’s historic anti-colonial position, its leadership of the NAM, and its historical support of the ANC, but also aware of South Africa’s position on human rights and the substantial trade relations between the two countries. Mandela connected with Gusmão due to both leaders’ personal convictions and imprisonment. Over time, Mandela’s initiatives produced results such as the release of Gusmão and his visit to South Africa. The country also contributed to post-conflict reconstruction and development of East Timor although it did not provide support to the two UN missions that oversaw the independence process in Timor-Leste.

Finally, Mandela and his ANC built on historical and contemporary relations with East Timor and Indonesia to contribute towards the self-determination of Timor-Leste. Mandela’s stature and influence regarding the East Timorese conflict made a remarkable difference in international efforts to resolve the conflict; aspects that have been recognised by Timor-Leste. The demonstrative effect of South Africa’s remarkable transition to democracy has in Timor-Leste a lasting legacy.