The safe return of refugees and IDPs is a highly sensitive and potentially volatile process, from the identification and registration of affected persons to their eventual and voluntary return, in safety and in dignity, and their subsequent reintegration. Even after their return, a number of political and security issues (e.g. property disputes) may arise, as communities that were abandoned by their original residents may have been resettled by others, leading to tensions and renewed conflict. The status of returnees who may have been former combatants is likely to be legally and politically complex, and to require further guidance. As is the case with other humanitarian activities, the return of refugees and IDPs is managed and led by specialized UN agencies and their implementing humanitarian partners. However, the peacekeeping mission is central to establishing safe and secure conditions, and can play an important supporting role before, during and after the return.

6.5.1 Operational activities

The key operational activities by the mission to support this output include:

  • Monitoring border crossings and securing return corridors.
  • Providing physical protection in the form of temporary shelters, working closely with the authorities responsible for camp management and security.
  • Coordinating and conducting mine clearance of routes and resettlement areas.
  • Ensuring a safe and secure environment around IDP camps.
  • In support of the host government, ensuring a safe and secure environment at the IDPs’/refugees’ places of origin to allow a safe return.
  • Providing logistical support to humanitarian agencies, as necessary and as requested, within the means and capabilities of the mission.
  • Monitoring, recording and reporting human rights violations and helping to ensure that all returns are voluntary.
  • Conducting civil affairs activities aimed at addressing the tensions between returnees and receiving communities.

6.1.2 Benchmarks

Short-term

  • Refugee and IDP camps are safe and secure and women’s security is being considered.
  • Refugees and IDPs are identified and registered and are agreeing to return voluntarily.
  • Border crossings and return corridors are secure and free of mines and other threats.

Medium-term

  • Places of origin are safe and secure, and women’s security is being considered.
  • Returns are taking place in an orderly and safe manner.
  • Accommodation and basic services are available on return.

Long-term

  • Reintegration of returnees is successful, and the receiving population is playing a supportive role.
  • Property disputes are being addressed through well- established and impartial mechanisms.
  • National and international policies and responses are better integrated with long-term development frameworks.

6.5.3 Responsibilities and coordination

The main responsibility for the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs rests with UNHCR or the International Organization for Migration, supported by WFP and UNICEF, and international and local NGOs. OCHA plays an important role in terms of coordination, policy and advocacy, but is not an operational agency directly engaged in the delivery of humanitarian programmes. The peacekeeping mission acts in a sup- porting role. Efforts should be closely coordinated by the DSRSG-RC/HC, in concert with the FC when the military is involved. Parameters for use of peacekeeping assets or personnel in support of the return of refugees and IDPs should be based on a detailed agreement between members of the MLT and the RC/HC, under the overall authority of the HoM.

In extreme situations, missions may be managing IDPs seeking protection from physical violence in what have been termed “POC sites” on or alongside UN bases as part of their mandate to protect civilians. This will require the direct engagement of the peacekeeping mission and the MLT to manage the facilities and provide security, in close coordination with humanitarian actors. Broadly speaking, the same issues apply to returning and reintegrating refugees in these sites.

6.5.4 Resources

Providing security for protection camps can tie down scarce mission resources. If possible, local security services (in particular the police) will need to be supported, which will often require police component resources. Securing border crossings and return corridors is labour intensive and may require considerable military resources. Ensuring that returns are voluntary and that possible disputes are addressed are core functions of several civilian sections such as Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Human Rights, and Public Information. It is therefore an integrated activity, which requires close coordination within the mission and with the UNCT, as well as adequate human and other resources.

6.5.5 Challenges and risks

  • Information on the number, needs and types of displaced people may be lacking or inaccurate, or even manipulated.
  • Refugee and IDP camps may become militarized and politicized and/or the centre of tensions and conflict, while borders become areas of direct security risk, particularly for women.
  • Host governments may have an interest in maintaining the status of refugee and IDP camps to garner international attention or, alternatively, seek to have them dismantled before there is a safe and secure environment for IDPs to return to.
  • Involuntary returns may create fear, tensions and instability.
  • Security conditions along return corridors may still be fragile.
  • Returning refugee or IDP groups may include former combatants who may seek to restart hostilities.
  • Resentment between returnees and receiving communities may be a source of instability and spark renewed conflict.
  • The status of refugees and IDPs could become institutionalized and entirely dependent on long-term emergency relief.
  • After prolonged periods in camps, IDPs may be reluctant to move back to their areas of origin.
  • Lack of coordination between the peacekeeping operation and humanitarian agencies.

6.5.6 Considerations

Balancing security and national ownership

Refugees and IDPs and their camps can become political pawns, and there is a danger that they will exacerbate tensions. The security of refugees, IDPs and their environment is a concern of the MLT. A balance must be struck between the mission’s responsibilities to protect vulnerable civilians and the principle of national ownership. Ideally, the security of the camps and their inhabitants should be a matter between UNHCR, the host government and the camps’ internal organizational structures.

However, the MLT may have a political role in facilitating the host government’s close engagement in and resolution of the issue, as well as a responsibility, in support of the host government, to ensure that the camps exist in a secure environment. The amount of mission resources to commit to this process will be a matter of MLT judgement.

Promoting speedy returns while ensuring that all returns are voluntary and take place in safety and dignity

The existence and reduction in the number of dependent refugees and IDPs tend to be international measures of a peacekeeping operation’s progress and success. While UNHCR is the lead on this issue, there may be tensions between the political motivations of the peacekeeping mission which will wish to free up committed resources and UNHCR’s humanitarian criteria. This will require close coordination of activities and messages within the UN system.

UNMIL: An accelerated, yet prudent and responsible, exit

When I arrived in Liberia in July 2015, the country was already fairly advanced along the path of peace consolidation. Achieving the long-awaited UN strategic goal in Liberia – attaining a steady state of security with national institutions able to maintain security independently of a peacekeeping mission – seemed closer than ever before. The democratically elected government had been in office for nearly 10 years, and the process of institution-building in the rule of law and security sector was at an advanced stage. Yet, fragility was palpable.

The UN Security Council had been considering the drawdown and withdrawal of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) since 2007. In my pre-deployment bilateral meetings with key members of the Security Council, most made it clear to me that the closure of the mission before the October 2017 general elections was a priority, and that preparation for that eventuality constituted the core of my mandate. They expressed frustration over a “wasteful mission creep”, in terms of both mandated timeframe and expanse, leading to an “acute and chronic dependency syndrome”.

However, the common narrative in Liberia – whether in the government or civil society, cities or countryside, the mission and other UN entities, or neighbouring, subregional and regional diplomatic representations – was running in the opposite direction. They argued that while there was significant progress in the area of security, the state of stability was still vulnerable, and people remained deeply weary of a dangerous relapse, which the government might not be able to handle in the absence of peacekeepers.

They pointed out that the electoral campaign, which is always accompanied by heightened levels political tension, had the potential to lead to widespread violence. As such, they argued that the mission should remain in place until Liberia was ready to stand on its own.

It was obvious that UNMIL must rapidly and fully concentrate on helping prepare the country, psychologically and operationally, for a post-UNMIL future. The task of completing the UNMIL mandate in an accelerated manner had to be implemented in tandem with the mission’s further drawdown as we moved closer to its closure. Our actions included extensive dialogue and engagement with the government, political parties and civil society leaders, as well as massive outreach campaign with (and through) the media and the general public, with a view to instilling self-confidence and national pride in assuming full responsibility for their future.

In the meantime, we accelerated the transfer of residual responsibilities in human rights monitoring, rule of law, national reconciliation and security sector reform to the government institutions, civil society and the UN Country Team. Given the critical significance of ensuring that transfer of power from President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to a new president took place through free, fair and peaceful elections, the mission successfully supported the joint appeal by the President and her Côte d’Ivoire counterpart, as well as many regional and subregional voices, for the Security Council to extend the mission’s mandate until after the elections and the inauguration of the new president.

Furthermore, the mission enhanced its assertive engagement with the three branches of government to expedite full implementation of the transition agenda and the preparation of a peacebuilding plan.

Farid Zarif, SRSG UNMIL, 2015–18

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Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peace Operations Copyright © 2021 by International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations. All Rights Reserved.

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