Tables of Figures

Chapter 1: Maritime Transportation Systems (Nichols)

Figure 1-1 CRYPTOWIZ
Figure 1-2 A Night View from CRYPTO-WIZ on Eastern Chesapeake Bay
Figure 1-3 The MTS Systems of Systems
Figure 1-4 Global Shipping Routes
Figure 1-5 World Map of Major Ports
Figure 1-6 Inland-Waterways of the United States
Figure 1-7 Intermodal Service Map
Figure 1-8 CIS Relationships
Figure 1-9 CIS Relationships
Figure 1-10 Cybersecurity Domains
Figure 1-11 Advanced Hacker Kit
Figure 1-12 21 Dark Web Tools
Figure 1-13 Top 8 Cyber Attacks
Figure 1-14 Top 100 Forensics Tools
Figure 1-15 RN Lethality Legend
Figure 1-16 CARVER
Figure 1-17 CARVER Variables
Figure 1-18 MSHARPP Example
Figure 1-19 OCTAVE
Figure 1-20 ADRA

Chapter 2: Global Threats to Communications Cables (Nichols & Beckman)

Figure 2-1 First Transcontinental Cable (1858) Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific, 2024)
Figure 2-2 SCC Composition and Construction Source: (WIKI, 2025)
Figure 2-3 SCC to Landing Point Source: (arc-anglerfish-arc2-prod-copesa/public/Q6LSMZOASVBSTKBN5PTAREOEPU.jpg, 2024)
Figure 2-4 Shows The Architecture Of A Standard Cable Hookup From the United States To The United Kingdom. Source: (CSIS, 2025) Reprinted with permission for presentation (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific, 2024)
Figure 2-5 Causes of Cable Faults (CSIS, 2025) Reprinted with permission for presentation (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific, 2024)
Figure 2-6 Cause of Underseas Telecommunication Cable Faults from (1959-2021) reprinted with permissions for presentation [See note below.] (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk cables in the Western Pacific, 2024)
Figure 2-7 Trans-Pacific Undersea Cables Sources (PBS, 2021) Reproduction permission courtesy of TeleGeography
Figure 2-8 26 Cable Systems (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific, 2024)
Figure 2-9 International Traffic in KTB Source: (hawaii.edu/news/, 2019) Reproduced with permission courtesy of Subtel.
Figure 2-10 Cables connecting to the Chinese Mainland Source: (Jamestown Org: Publication: China Brief Volume: 21 Issue: 18, 2021)
Figure 2-11 Chinese Ownership in Cables Source: (SCMP, 2021)
Figure 2-12 Threats – Redundancy in the South China Sea for China Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific, 2024)
Figure 2-13 Threats – Russian Losharik Source: (Russian Losharik, 2020) (everything-known-about-losharik, 2019)
Figure 2-14 Threats – Russian Losharik Cutway Source: (Russian Losharik, 2020) (Sun Corp., 2021) (Forbes, 2023)
Figure 2-15 Chinese YANTAR Source: (WIKI, 2018)
Figure 2-16 Vulnerabilities – Landing Stations and Cables Source: (R.K. Nichols, Johnson, & Diebold, 2024)
Figure 2-17 Vulnerabilities – Landing Stations and Cables Source: (R.K. Nichols, Johnson, & Diebold, 2024)
Figure 2-18 Vulnerabilities – Landing Stations and Cables Source: (R.K. Nichols, Johnson, & Diebold, 2024)
Figure 2-19 Vulnerabilities – Landing Stations and Cables Source: (R.K. Nichols, Johnson, & Diebold, 2024)
Figure 2-20 Vulnerabilities – Landing Stations and Cables Source: (R.K. Nichols, Johnson, & Diebold, 2024)
Figure 2-21 Vulnerabilities – Cables Traversing the South China Sea Source: (R.K. Nichols, Johnson, & Diebold, 2024)
Figure 2-22 AAG Cable System Source: (Vietnam news, 2024) (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific, 2024)
Figure 2-23 New High-Capacity Trans-Pacific Cable Routes Source: (aag-cable-system, 2023) (R.K. Nichols, Johnson, & Diebold, 2024)
Figure 2-24 Guam, The Big Switch in the Pacific – A historic list of telecommunications cables landing on Guam. Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific, 2024) (CIMSEC, 2023)

Chapter 3: Naval Strategic Importance of Guam and its Defense (Diebold & Nichols)

Figure 3-1 PRC in Philippines 08082025 Source: (SEALIGHT FOUNDATION, 2025)
CARVER Perspective: Facts and Assumptions
Figure 3-2 CARVER Perspective: What cables and landing points have an outsized impact on mission command of US Forces in I-PACOM? (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-3 CARVER Perspective: What cables and landing points have an outsized impact on mission command of US Forces in I-PACOM? (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-4 The Ryan Nichols Equation Perspective -Spratly Islands Source: (R.K.Nichols, Johnson, & Diebold, 2024)
Figure 3-5 Carver Perspective for Hawaii Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-6 CARVER Perspective Makaha Landing Station Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-7 CARVER Perspective Keawaula Landing Station Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-8 Guam – Piti and Tanguisson Point, Guam is known as the “Big Switch in the Pacific.” Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-9 Guam Department of Defense Facility Geography Source: R.K.Nichols, Johnson, & Diebold, 2024) (CIMSEC, 2023)
Figure 3-10 Guam Military Threats Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-11 China’s Guam Killer. Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-12 PLAN Presence Near Guam Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-13 Guam Power Projections Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-14 SE Asia Terrorism: Countermeasures Source: R.K. Nichols, Johnson, & Diebold, 2024)
Figure 3-15 Guam’s Cable System Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-16 Guam – Piti and Tanguisson Landing Points (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-17 Guam – Piti and Tanguisson Landing Points Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-18 Tanguisson Cable Landing Station Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-19 Tanguisson Cable Landing Station Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-20 Analysis: Tanguisson CLS to Military Facility Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-21 Tanguisson Cable Landing Station – Carver Analysis Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-22 Piti-I Cable Landing Station Location Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-23 Piti-I Cable Landing Station Location Distance to DoD Installations Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-24 Guam Police Coverage Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-25 Piti-I Cable Landing Station Power Station Target System Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-26 Piti-I Cable Landing Station CARVER Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-27 Hong Kong Geography Source: (World Atlas, 2025)
Figure 3-28 The Ryan Nichols Equation Perspective -Hong Kong Cyber Attack / Surveillance Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-29 Total Undersea Cable Networks Landing in Hong Kong Source: (CIENA)
Figure 3-30 Lantau Island Source: (maps-hong-kong.com/lantau-island-tourist-map, 2025)
Figure 3-31 Lantu Island Cable Landing Station Connections Source: (Nichols, Diebold, & Johnson, Risk Analysis of submarine cables in the Western Pacific -Part 2, 2024)
Figure 3-32 SCC equals Profit Source: (Nichols R., “C:\Users\profr\OneDrive\Documents\HYSOL\C2SR Symposium October 28, 2022, TOPIC-Cyber Terror CHINA TAIWAN-ECD ANTI-SPOOFING READY REV 12A 03182024.pptx”, 2022)
Figure 3-33 Global SCC Map (Nichols R. “C:\Users\profr\OneDrive\Documents\HYSOL\C2SR Symposium October 28, 2022, TOPIC-Cyber Terror CHINA TAIWAN-ECD ANTI-SPOOFING READY REV 12A 03182024.pptx”, 2022)

Chapter 4: Integrating Drones Into USAF Ops (DeMaio)

Figure 4-1 Pearl Harbor, May 3, 1040 (Source: ibiblio.org)
Figure 4-2 Operation Spider Web (Source: kyivindependent.com)
Figure 4-3 Ukraine Drone Forces Operator (Source: gisreportsonline.com)
Figure 4-4 Ukraine Drone Production (Source: mwi.westpoint.edu)
Figure 4-5 B-2 & GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (Source: youtube.com)
Figure 4-6 F-22 Shootdown of Chinese Balloon (Source: washingtonpost.com)
Figure 4-7 Joint Publication 3.0 Counterair Framework (Source: irp.fas.org)
Figure 4-8 Aerospace Operations Notional Doctrine (Source: Author Slide)
Figure 4-9 Agile Combat Employment Visualization (Source: The LeMay Center)
Figure 4-10 Kadena Agile Combat Employment (Source: Author Slide)
Figure 4-11 Kadena Agile Combat Employment (Source: Author Slide)

Chapter 5: Cyberattacks on the Maritime Sector (Nichols & Malhotra)

Figure 5-1 Attack Sophistication vs Intruder Knowledge to 2016 Source: (Adelaide Students Project, 2025)
Figure 5-2 OT/ICS Cyber Cheat Sheet (LINKEDIN, 2025) Cropped-1
Figure 5-3 List of Digital Forensic Tools in Cybersecurity (LINKEDIN, 2025) Cropped-1
Figure 5-4 Cybersecurity Search Engines (LINKEDIN, 2025) Cropped-1
Figure 5-5 Types of Cyber Attacks (LINKEDIN, 2025) Cropped-1
Figure 5-6 Fake Videos (LINKEDIN, 2025) Cropped-1
Figure 5-7 Cyber Tools by Category (Hackernet group news, 2025) Cropped-1
Figure 5-8 SIEM SOC Checklist (SIEM Alerts List Group, 2025) Cropped-1
Figure 5-9 OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities (ICyber Press, 2025) Cropped-1
Figure 5-10 ISO 27001 ISMS Security Architecture Diagram (Techsecure, 2025)
Figure 5-11 When a Ship Crashed into a Norwegian Backyard Like a Scene from a Disaster Figure 5-12 Examples of Vulnerabilities on a ship Source: Courtesy of (Akpan & et.al., 2022)
Figure 5-13 The roles in decentralized identity methods: Web Consortium specification

Chapter 6: Port Security Law in the United States (Lonstein)

Figure 6-1 The Turtle (Courtesy American Battlefield Trust)
Figure 6-2 Continental Congress, April 3, 1776 (Library of Congress)
Figure 6-3 Revenue Cutter Service Logo, Circa 1809 (US Coast Guard)
Figure 6-4 Fort Schuyler, Throgs Neck, NY (Courtesy SUNY Maritime College)
Figure 6-5 Ellis Island – Circa 1892 (Courtesy Statue of Liberty – Ellis Island Foundation)
Figure 6-6 Political Cartoon about the Espionage Act (National Constitution Center)
Figure 6-7 Project Underworld Illustrations (Courtesy Warfare History Network, International Longshoremen’s Association, War History Online)
Figure 6-8 Autonomous Port Attack (Courtesy Wayne Lonstein)

Chapter 7: Connected, Complex, Compromised (Murthy & Ghaffari)

Figure 7-1 Cruise Vehicle Components per the latest safety act regulations. Source: (Cruise Ship Safety, 2015)
Figure 7-2 Simplified View of Shipboard Communication and Network Systems Source: Author
Figure 7-3 MiTS w-Navigation Architecture Source: (Hagen & et al, 2011)
Figure 7-4 GMDSS sample onboard communication devices. Source: (Admin, 2019)
Figure 7-5 GMDSS combined communication diagram Source: (admin, 2019)
Figure 7-6: Sample digital display and comms. Source: (2024)
Figure 7-7 Container shipping company A.P. Moller-Maersk Source: (Tripwire, 2017)
Figure 7-8 Impacted NotPetya attacks by countries, not restrained by borders. Source: (2022)
Figure 7-9 IMO Strengthens Cyber Risk Management Source: (Admin, 2025)

Chapter 8: Naval Advanced Weapons Systems (Puntoriero)

Figure 8-1 A photo illustration of HELIOS destroying a target (Roaten, 2022)
Figure 8-2 Anduril Copperhead high-speed Autonomous Underwater Vehicles Source: (Anduril, 2024)
Figure 8-3 Flight testing of the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) prototype Source: (DOT&E, 2022)
Figure 8-4 Electromagnetic railgun prototype aboard the USS Millinocket. Source: (Eckstein, 2015)

Chapter 9: Anti-Piracy Countermeasures (Mumm & Malhotra)

Figure 9-1 Henry Morgan’s ship off the coast of Gorgona in the Pacific by Montague Dawson (Staff, 2023).
Figure 9-2 Pirates and Democracy: A Surprising History of Equality on the High Seas (Kucera, 2025).
Figure 9-3 Captain Phillips movie image of pirates approaching the MV Maersk Alabama (Donaldo, 2013).
Figure 9-4 Stopping Piracy at Sea-UK Ministry of Defense (David, 2015).
Figure 9-5 (Number of pirate attacks against ships worldwide from 2010 to 2024, 2025)
Figure 9-6 Tugboats assist the containership MSC Anzu into the Agua Clara locks completed in 2016 (Staff, 2021).
Figure 9-7 LRAD deployed for anti-piracy (Raunek, 2024).
Figure 9-8 Anti-Piracy laser device (Raunek, 2024).
Figure 9-9 Land-based ADS on a Humvee (Raunek, 2024).
Figure 9-10 Marine Navigation Systems (Gahnstrom, 2024)
Figure 9-11 Verifiable Credential Trust Triangle (Preukschat & Reed, 2021)
Figure 9-12 Verifiable Credentials to prove the authenticity of a product in the supply chain (Malhotra, 2025)
Figure 9-13 Verifiable credentials to verify a good GPS signal (Malhotra, 2025)
Figure 9-14 Verifiable credentials to verify a person’s identity (Malhotra, 2025)

Chapter 10: UAS / UUV Threats launched from Ships (Mumm & Ghaffari)

Figure 10-1 ScanEagle UAS Ship Launch Source: (“ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial System,” 2025)
Figure 10-2 REMUS UUV Source: (“REMUS UUVS,” 2025)
Figure 10-3 MQ-4C Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Source: (“Meet the US Navy’s Largest Unmanned Aerial Vehicle,” 2025)
Figure 10-4 An MQ-25 Stingray test asset conducts deck handling maneuvers in 2021 while underway aboard the USS George H.W. Bush. (US Navy) Source: (Burchett, 2024)
Figure 10-5 Source: (“REMUS UUVS,” 2025)
Figure 10-6 Source: (“Orca XLUUV, USA,” 2024)
Figure 10-7 Source: (Sutton, 2019)
Figure 10-8 Sources: (O’Rourke, 2020); NATO, Integrating Maritime Unmanned Systems into Maritime Operations. (NATO, 2023)Maritime Robotics Otter USV. (Thomas, 2025). The maritime industry, while embracing digitalization, faces a growing cyber threat landscape. (2024).
Figure 10-9 NATO, Integrating Maritime Unmanned Systems into Maritime Operations. Source: (NATO, 2023)
Figure 10-10 Maritime Robotics Otter USV. Source: (Thomas, 2025).
Figure 10-11 The maritime industry, while embracing digitalization, faces a growing cyber threat landscape. Source: (2024).

Chapter 11: Sea of Risk (Murthy)

Figure 11-1 Maritime Port, part of Maritime Mainland Systems (Source: Bing Image Search)
Figure 11-2 Example of a route(s) in Maritime Transportation Systems (Source: Bing Image Search)
Figure 11-3 STRATOS: Strategic Thinking and Resilience Across Tactics, Outcomes, and

Chapter 12: Offshore Chemical Engineering & Quantum Technologies For Maritime Risk & Resilience (Sharkey)

Figure 12-1 Quantum-enhanced offshore platform at sunset with a female engineer and chemical visualization. Source: Image generated by ChatGPT using OpenAI’s DALL·E, 2025.
Figure 12-2 Simplified schematic of the Haber–Bosch process for ammonia production. Hydrogen (H₂) and nitrogen (N₂) gases are compressed and passed through a catalytic reactor. The hot ammonia-rich gas is cooled via heat exchange (HX) and condensed into liquid NH₃, while unreacted gases are recycled. Purge gas may be directed to power generation systems. Source: Darmawan & Lokahita (2012).
Figure 12-3 Process overview for ammonia as a maritime fuel. This schematic illustrates the transition pathway from conventional marine fuels—including liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)—toward ammonia-based alternatives. Key chemical engineering components include hydrogen (H₂) production via electrolysis, ammonia synthesis through the Haber-Bosch process, and subsequent storage and bunkering infrastructure for shipborne applications. The chart highlights integration steps between bridging fuels and carbon-neutral maritime fuel systems. Source: Ammonia Energy Association, 2020).
Figure 12-4 This illustration shows offshore ammonia synthesis and synthetic fuel production with a modular vessel platform equipped with electrolysis units, ammonia and methanol reactors, and chemical pathways for carbon dioxide capture and transformation. Source: Image generated by ChatGPT using OpenAI’s DALL·E, 2025.
Figure 12-5 Scanning electron microscope (SEM) image of nitrogen-doped graphitic porous carbon (NGPC) showing hexagonal and layered morphologies at nanoscale resolution. These materials serve as electrocatalysts in ammonia fuel cells and oxygen reduction reactions (ORR), offering high surface area, tunable porosity, and enhanced conductivity. Source: Nitrogen-doped Graphitic Porous Carbon (NGPC), 1g (2025), ACSMaterial. https://www.acsmaterial.com/nitrogen-doped-graphitic-porous-carbon.html
Figure 12-6 Quantum circuit model and superconducting processor for molecular orbital simulation. Panels (a–d) illustrate IBM’s approach to quantum chemistry simulation using a six-qubit superconducting quantum processor: (a) Mapped electron orbital occupations for the BeH₂ molecule mapped to qubits Q1–Q6. Each colored bar indicates a qubit assigned to simulate a specific molecular orbital, including core orbitals like 1s, valence orbitals like 2s and 2pₓ, and their spin states (↑ or ↓). (b) An optical micrograph of the IBM six-qubit superconducting device with resonator circuits is color-coded to match the corresponding qubits used in the simulation. (c) Quantum circuit layout for the unitary coupled cluster (UCC) ansatz [a method for describing correlated electron systems using quantum gates] with entangling layers (U_ENT) and variational single-qubit rotations (Uᵢʲ(θₖ)). This design allows energy minimization through iterative tuning of quantum gate parameters. (d) Illustration of multi-qubit entanglement across qubits using wavefunction overlays, simulating electronic correlation across molecular orbitals. Source: Adapted from Russell, J. (2017). IBM Breaks Ground for Complex Quantum Chemistry. HPCwire. https://www.hpcwire.com/2017/09/14/ibm-breaks-ground-complex-quantum-chemistry/.
Figure 12-7 Inversion doubling in ammonia. The left panel shows the vibrational (v; v = 0, 1, 2) potential wells for ammonia in its “up” (or zero qubit state) and “down” (or one qubit state) pyramidal configurations separated by an inversion barrier. The right panel illustrates the quantum tunneling effect, where wavefunction overlap leads to the formation of symmetric (Ψg) and antisymmetric (Ψu) states, creating measurable spectral splitting (~35 cm⁻¹). This phenomenon exemplifies the quantum mechanical nature of molecular vibrations and has implications for the use of ammonia in quantum information science.
Source: Adapted from Bradley, M. (n.d.). Inversion Doubling of Ammonia. Thermo Fisher Scientific. https://tools.thermofisher.com/content/sfs/brochures/AN50753-E-0415M-Ammonia.pdf
Figure 12-8 This diagram illustrates the working principle of the effects from using a quantum gravimeter as applied to maritime environments. In Zhou et al.’s (2025) configuration, a compact atom-interferometric gravimeter was demonstrated with a sensitivity on the order of 1 E (1 Eötvös), which corresponds to 0.1 μGal/m, where: 1 μGal (microgalileo) = 10⁻⁸ m/s² (a millionth of Earth’s gravitational acceleration), and 0.1 μGal/m refers to the spatial gravity gradient: a change of 0.1 μGal over one meter of distance. This extreme sensitivity allows detection of small gravitational anomalies caused by seafloor features.
Figure 12-9 AI-enhanced chemical monitoring system visualized as a digital nerve center for offshore infrastructure. This conceptual illustration depicts autonomous sensors and algorithms detecting anomalies in process flows, gas emissions, or catalytic behavior. As AI increasingly governs chemical synthesis and safety at sea, risks of algorithmic error, adversarial spoofing, or data drift must be considered alongside benefits like predictive diagnostics and self-healing systems. These dual-use systems require careful integration of cybersecurity, redundancy, and human oversight to ensure operational resilience. Source: Image generated by ChatGPT using OpenAI’s DALL·E, based on risk modeling concepts from Section 12.6.
Figure 12-10 Floating Intelligence: Reactive Maritime Infrastructure. This conceptual illustration depicts a future oceanic ecosystem of sea-based quantum laboratories, offshore platforms-as-systems, and unmanned oceanic mesh nodes. Key elements include cryogenic quantum hardware, chemical reactors, AI-coordinated fuel cycles, and autonomous data-sharing buoys. The system visualizes adaptive, distributed intelligence across chemical and navigational infrastructure, supporting autonomous operation and strategic resilience in contested maritime zones. Source: Image generated by ChatGPT using OpenAI’s DALL·E, 2025.
Figure 12-11 Chlorine Poison Gas Attack Ypres 1915