8 Naval Advanced Weapons Systems (Puntoriero)

Abbreviations

A2/AD – Anti-Access / Area Denial
AI – Artificial Intelligence
C-HGB – Common Hypersonic Glide Body
C4ISR – Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CROWS – Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems
DDG(X) – Future Guided-Missile Destroyer (next-generation DDG)
DEWs – Directed-Energy Weapons
DMO – Distributed Maritime Operations
DOT&E – Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
EA-18G – Electronic Attack variant of the F/A-18 aircraft (“Growler”)
EMALS – Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System
EMW – Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare
EO/IR – Electro-Optical / Infrared
EW – Electronic Warfare
GPS – Global Positioning System
HCMs – Hypersonic Cruise Missiles
HELs – High Energy Lasers
HELIOS – High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-Dazzler and Surveillance
HELCAP – High Energy Laser Counter–Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Program
HELSI – High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative
HGVs – Hypersonic Glide Vehicles
HPMs – High-Power Microwaves
HVPs – Hypervelocity Projectiles
ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
LRHW – Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon
ONR – Office of Naval Research
SCIFiRE – Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment
SEWIP – Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program
SM-6 – Standard Missile-6
SSNs – Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarines
UAS – Unmanned Aerial Systems
UAVs – Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
USVs – Unmanned Surface Vessels
UUVs – Unmanned Underwater Vehicles
VPM – Virginia Payload Module
XLUUV – Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle 

Student Learning Objectives

• Evaluate the role of emerging technologies in shaping naval doctrine.
• Assess the operational and strategic implications of technological integration.
• Apply multi-domain perspectives to future naval warfare scenarios.
• Analyze ethical and legal considerations in the employment of advanced naval weapons.

Introduction

Naval warfare has always been shaped by technological innovation. From sail to steam and from battleship to aircraft carrier, controlling the seas has depended on integrating new tools into existing strategies. However, in the twenty-first century, the nature of maritime conflict is shifting toward multi-domain threats that go well beyond the traditional focus on fleet size or missile stockpiles. Swarming unmanned aerial systems (UAS), long-range precision strike missiles, cyber and electronic warfare, and hypersonic projectiles are creating scenarios where conventional defenses could become overwhelmed or economically exhausted (Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2025a). In response, the U.S. Navy identified directed-energy weapons and autonomous systems as key elements of the next revolution in maritime defense (CRS, 2024).

Directed-energy weapons, like the U.S. Navy’s HELIOS system, along with autonomous subsurface vehicles, are transforming both the technical basics and the doctrinal use of naval power. Directed-energy weapons offer nearly instant engagement, very low cost per shot, and virtually unlimited magazines as long as they have power (Director, Operational Test & Evaluation [DOT&E], 2025). At the same time, autonomous undersea platforms such as the Orca Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) expand fleet presence into contested areas, minimize risks to human crews, and support distributed maritime operations (DMO) (CRS, 2025b).

The discussion starts with the principles of directed-energy weapons, highlighting their benefits and limitations. It then focuses on the U.S. Navy’s HELIOS system, examining its architecture, testing, and doctrinal purpose. Autonomous subsurface systems are also discussed, especially large displacement UUVs. Emerging naval weapons—hypersonics, railguns, and cyber-electromagnetic tools—are then reviewed. Lastly, the analysis explores doctrinal shifts such as DMO and layered defense, ending with plans including the U.S. Navy’s HELCAP program and the DDG(X) destroyer, which is built to host megawatt-class lasers.

Together, these sections argue that directed-energy and autonomy are not isolated projects but represent foundational changes to naval warfare, requiring ongoing investment, adaptable doctrine, and international collaboration to maintain maritime superiority.

SECTION 1: Directed-Energy Weapons: Revolutionizing Naval Defense

Directed-energy weapons (DEWs) use focused electromagnetic energy to damage or disrupt enemy systems without depending on kinetic munitions. They include high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-power microwaves (HPMs). Lasers can physically destroy a target (“hard kill”) or blind sensors (“soft kill”) (CRS, 2024). Their advantages include rapid engagement, low cost per shot compared to missiles, and almost unlimited magazines limited only by ship power and cooling capacity (DOT&E, 2025). These features make them effective against swarming unmanned aerial systems or inexpensive cruise missiles (CRS, 2025a). However, their limitations involve atmospheric interference, thermal blooming, and the high-power demands for scaling to counter supersonic and hypersonic threats (Office of Naval Research [ONR], 2021).

The U.S. Navy’s High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-Dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) represents the first operational step in this field (See Figure 8-1). Delivered by Lockheed Martin in 2022 and integrated aboard the USS Preble (DDG-88), HELIOS is a ~60 kW fiber-laser system that is scalable to 120 kW (Lockheed Martin, 2018; CRS, 2025a). It combines three roles in one package: (1) destructive hard-kill laser, (2) optical dazzler for sensor disruption, and (3) electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) surveillance for targeting (CRS, 2024). Additionally, the HELIOS is capable of integrating with the Aegis Combat System, ingesting radar tracks, and executing engagements within the existing fire control loop (DOT&E, 2025).

Live-fire testing in FY2024 aboard Preble confirmed HELIOS’s effectiveness against unmanned aerial systems, validating beam stability and combat system integration (DOT&E, 2025). By adding a non-kinetic dazzler effect, HELIOS also supports escalation management, allowing commanders to disrupt sensors without immediate lethal action. This function is particularly relevant in gray-zone competition. Economically, HELIOS transforms the cost-exchange ratio: engagements cost a few dollars compared to the $4 million price of an SM-6 interceptor, preserving missile inventories for high-end threats (CRS, 2025a).

The deployment of HELIOS signals a shift in doctrine. Traditional layered defense relies on missiles at various ranges, supported by electronic warfare. HELIOS adds an energy-based layer that continuously defends against low-cost saturation attacks while reducing dependence on limited missile stocks. This aligns with DMO, where dispersed units must sustain combat power without resupply. Ships equipped with HELIOS gain ongoing self-defense and ISR capabilities, while also supporting the fleet’s shared sensor network (U.S. Navy, 2023). Adversaries pursuing similar systems highlight strategic competition. China has tested shipborne lasers on its Type 055 destroyers, while Russia deploys dazzlers, such as the Filin 5P-42 (CRS, 2025a). Allied programs, such as the UK’s DragonFire and Israel’s Iron Beam, show that directed-energy weapons are becoming a global standard (Naval News, 2025; Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, 2025).

In sum, HELIOS confirms that naval lasers are practically useful. Although scaling up to counter hypersonics will need megawatt-class systems on DDG(X), current use already impacts tactics by providing a proportional, affordable, and persistent defense. Directed energy is no longer just an experiment but a fundamental part of naval combat.

SECTION 2: Autonomous Systems: Expanding Naval Reach

Autonomous systems represent one of the most significant shifts in naval warfare since the aircraft carrier. Advances in artificial intelligence, modular payloads, and resilient communications now allow unmanned platforms to assume missions once reserved for manned ships and submarines. The U.S. Navy defines three categories: unmanned surface vessels (USVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Among these, subsurface autonomy offers unique advantages in endurance, persistence, and risk reduction (CRS, 2025a).

The centerpiece of this project is Boeing’s Orca Extra-Large UUV (XLUUV). With approximately 50-ton displacement and modular payload bays, Orca can perform intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), mine countermeasures, and anti-submarine warfare missions at distances over 1,000 nautical miles (Boeing, 2023; CRS, 2025b). Orca builds on the Echo Voyager prototype and is designed for clandestine operations in denied waters, offering a persistent undersea presence without the high costs associated with nuclear-powered submarines. Medium UUVs, such as Huntington Ingalls’ REMUS 600 and Bluefin-21, assist with mine detection, hydrographic surveys, and environmental mapping, while smaller vehicles enable distributed sensing in littoral zones (HII, 2023). Collectively, this system family allows customized deployment for different mission types.

The U.S. Navy has committed more than $5.3 billion to unmanned maritime systems between FY2023 and FY2025, including $21.5 million for Orca and nearly $93 million for large and medium USVs (U.S. Navy, 2023; CRS, 2025b). Industry has responded with systems like Anduril’s Seabed Sentry and Copperhead, which focus on persistent subsea ISR and modularity (Anduril, 2024) (See Figure 8-2). These developments underscore autonomy as a core institutional priority rather than an experiment.

Operational advantages are evident. UUVs offer unmatched persistence compared to manned platforms, reduce risks to personnel, and provide modularity for various missions. They also free nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to focus on strategic deterrence and strike, aligning with DMO, which spreads combat power across wider areas (Department of the Navy, 2020). From a deterrence standpoint, UUVs make adversary planning more difficult by patrolling chokepoints and sea lines of communication, increasing uncertainty about U.S. undersea coverage.

Challenges persist, however. Underwater communications are limited in bandwidth, requiring high autonomy with restricted command and control. Cybersecurity risks expand as unmanned systems increase the attack surface (CRS, 2025b). Ethical and legal concerns remain about autonomous lethal actions under the Law of Armed Conflict. Integrating these systems into fleet doctrine also requires cultural adaptation, with commanders learning to trust autonomy as a core rather than an auxiliary part of naval operations (U.S. Navy, 2021).

Autonomous subsurface systems are transitioning from niche tools to central elements of the fleet. Large-displacement platforms like Orca extend endurance and modular strike options, while medium and small UUVs provide scalable ISR and mine warfare support. By reinforcing presence, sea control, and deterrence, these systems represent not just technological innovation but also a doctrinal evolution toward distributed, resilient undersea operations.

SECTION 3: Emerging Naval Weapon Systems

3.1 Hypersonic Weapons

Hypersonic weapons, defined as systems capable of sustained, maneuverable flight at speeds above Mach 5, represent one of the most disruptive advancements in naval warfare. Unlike traditional ballistic missiles, which follow predictable parabolic arcs, hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs) combine extreme speed, maneuverability, and low-altitude flight profiles that overwhelm most existing missile defense systems. For the U.S. Navy, hypersonics provide the chance to regain long-range strike dominance and challenge adversary anti-access/area denial networks in contested regions.

The U.S. Navy’s primary hypersonic program is the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) system, which uses the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB). Developed by Sandia National Laboratories and the U.S. Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, the glide body is boosted to hypersonic speeds with a large-diameter booster before separating to maneuver independently during flight. The joint Army-Navy program ensures commonality, with the Army deploying the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) on mobile land-based launchers. At the same time, the Navy adapts CPS (See Figure 8-3) for deployment on ships and submarines (CRS, 2024). The Navy has organized its integration plan in phases, starting with the Zumwalt-class destroyers, which have large vertical launch cells and advanced power systems that make them suitable early platforms. USS Zumwalt will be the first operational ship to deploy CPS after its mid-2020s refit. Subsurface integration is planned for Block V Virginia-class submarines beginning in 2027, with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) enabling the launch of large-diameter hypersonic missiles (U.S. Navy, 2023).

The technical challenges of hypersonic systems are formidable. At speeds exceeding Mach 5, the thermal environment surrounding the glide body generates plasma sheathing and extreme temperatures that can exceed 2,000 degrees Celsius. This necessitates advanced thermal protection systems, hardened guidance electronics, and aerodynamic control surfaces capable of surviving intense heat and pressure (Department of Defense [DoD], 2022). Launch platform integration presents further hurdles. Standard Mk 41 Vertical Launch Systems, common to Arleigh Burke destroyers and Ticonderoga cruisers, cannot accommodate CPS due to the missile’s size. This limitation explains why the U.S. Navy chose the Zumwalt-class and later the VPM-equipped Virginias as initial hosts, while ensuring that the future DDG(X) destroyer is designed from inception to carry CPS (CRS, 2024).

Furthermore, the doctrinal implications of naval hypersonics are profound. Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare emphasizes that maritime forces achieve deterrence by holding adversary centers of gravity at risk (Department of the Navy, 2020). Hypersonics precisely provide this capability by enabling sea-based forces to threaten critical targets such as command centers, integrated air defenses, and logistical nodes at ranges exceeding 2,000 miles. Because these weapons can be launched from dispersed platforms, they fit naturally within the U.S. Navy’s DMO concept, allowing effects to be massed across a wide battlespace without concentrating ships in one area (U.S. Navy, 2018). Their joint development with the U.S. Army further strengthens this posture. The LRHW and CPS, operating in tandem from land and sea, ensure that U.S. forces can deliver cross-domain, redundant hypersonic strike capabilities, a practical expression of the joint integration envisioned in Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022).

Nevertheless, hypersonics also create significant challenges for strategic stability. The speed and maneuverability of these systems compress adversary decision timelines, raising the risk of miscalculation. A conventional hypersonic launch against a strategic node could be misinterpreted as nuclear in nature, given the similarity in launch profiles between ballistic missiles and long-range hypersonic gliders. The Congressional Budget Office (2023) highlighted this ambiguity as a serious escalation risk, noting that adversaries might not be able to distinguish between conventional and nuclear hypersonic weapons in real-time. For this reason, naval employment of CPS must be paired with deliberate command-and-control safeguards, signaling measures, and integration into joint doctrine to avoid unintended escalation.

The progress of its adversaries drives the United States’ pursuit of CPS. China has deployed the DF-17, a medium-range ballistic missile paired with an operational hypersonic glide vehicle, in addition to its DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles that already threaten carrier strike groups. Russia has fielded the Tsirkon (3M22) hypersonic cruise missile on its surface combatants and submarines and continues to advance the Avangard HGV. These developments underscore that U.S. competitors are transitioning hypersonics from prototypes to operational deployment, necessitating a U.S. naval response (CRS, 2024). At the same time, allied efforts complement the U.S. program. Australia and the United States are collaborating through the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) to develop an air-launched hypersonic cruise missile, highlighting the importance of interoperability and allied innovation (DoD, 2022).

Taken together, these efforts illustrate both the opportunity and the danger of naval hypersonics. For the U.S. Navy, CPS offers unprecedented ability to project power from sea-based platforms, complicating adversary defense planning and reinforcing deterrence by holding high-value targets at risk. Integrated into DMO, hypersonics allow dispersed forces to mass effects at strategic ranges, providing commanders with flexibility and resilience in contested theaters. At the same time, their deployment heightens escalation risks and arms race dynamics, requiring careful doctrinal integration and signaling to mitigate instability. As Zumwalt-class destroyers and Virginia-class submarines begin to field CPS in the late 2020s, hypersonics will reshape naval warfare by extending U.S. maritime strike capacity into ranges and speeds that adversaries cannot easily defend against.

3.2 Electromagnetic Railguns

Electromagnetic railguns once led naval innovation, offering a revolutionary boost in range, lethality, and magazine capacity. By using electromagnetic energy to accelerate projectiles past Mach 6, railguns remove the need for chemical propellants and deliver hypersonic kinetic effects at a fraction of the cost of traditional missiles. Conceptually, railguns could strike targets at distances of 100 nautical miles or more, giving surface combatants unmatched reach against ships, aircraft, and land targets. The idea of a virtually unlimited magazine, with each shot costing only tens of thousands of dollars compared to multimillion-dollar missile interceptors, aligned with the U.S. Navy’s goal of expanding layered defenses while lowering the logistics burden of maintaining finite missile supplies (CRS, 2017).

The U.S. Navy began investing heavily in railgun technology in the early 2000s through the Office of Naval Research (ONR), which awarded contracts to BAE Systems and General Atomics (See Figure 8-4) to develop electromagnetic launchers and pulsed power systems. The intent was to integrate these weapons aboard future surface combatants such as the Zumwalt-class destroyers, whose integrated power systems were designed with directed-energy and advanced weapon concepts in mind. Laboratory testing at ONR facilities demonstrated the repeated firing of 32-megajoule prototypes, successfully launching projectiles at velocities exceeding 2 kilometers per second. By the mid-2010s, the Navy had conducted hundreds of test shots, validating the basic physics of electromagnetic acceleration and demonstrating the lethality of kinetic projectiles against surrogate targets (Office of Naval Research, 2015).

Despite these achievements, railguns faced enduring challenges that ultimately stalled their transition to the fleet. One critical limitation was barrel wear. The extreme stresses generated by repeated electromagnetic launches rapidly degraded barrel liners, reducing service life and necessitating frequent replacement. Thermal management was equally problematic, as sustained rates of fire required advanced cooling systems and robust barrel materials not yet available at scale. Power generation presented another obstacle. While Zumwalt-class destroyers possessed integrated power systems capable of producing approximately 78 megawatts, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and Ticonderoga cruisers lacked sufficient capacity to support sustained railgun firing. Retrofitting existing ships proved cost-prohibitive, and building new classes of ships around the weapon would have required decades of procurement planning (CRS, 2017).

Doctrinally, railguns promised to alter naval warfare in ways parallel to hypersonic and directed-energy weapons. They were envisioned as tools for both offensive strike and layered defense, capable of intercepting incoming cruise or ballistic missiles with sheer kinetic energy while simultaneously extending surface strike range against adversary vessels. In principle, this would have allowed the U.S. Navy to supplement expensive missile interceptors with a low-cost, high-velocity alternative, thereby dramatically improving the cost-effectiveness ratios in defensive engagements. The use of inert projectiles also eliminated the risks associated with explosive storage aboard ships, simplifying logistics and reducing vulnerability to magazine explosions. These advantages aligned with the doctrinal principles of economy of force and sustained sea control articulated in Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare (Department of the Navy, 2020).

Yet as research progressed, the Navy concluded that near-term investments would be better directed toward hypersonic missiles and directed-energy weapons. In 2021, reports surfaced that the Navy had reallocated railgun research funding to support the Conventional Prompt Strike program and high-energy laser development. Congressional Research Service assessments noted that while railgun physics were validated, the technological and logistical hurdles of barrel life, thermal management, and power integration outweighed the immediate benefits given parallel advancements in hypersonics (CRS, 2021). The U.S. Navy’s FY2022 budget request included no dedicated railgun development funding, marking a de facto pause in the program.

Nevertheless, railgun research has not entirely ceased. ONR and defense industry partners continue limited work on electromagnetic launch systems, with potential uses for missile defense, aircraft launch, and future strike platforms. Lessons from railgun testing are guiding similar technologies, including pulsed power systems for lasers and electromagnetic aircraft launch systems (EMALS) now in use on Ford-class carriers. Industry emphasizes the potential of electromagnetic projectile technologies, noting that hypervelocity projectiles (HVPs) made for railguns can be fired from standard 5-inch naval guns, providing a lower-cost way to increase range and lethality without the infrastructure needed for full-scale railgun deployment (Office of Naval Research, 2015; CRS, 2021).

From a doctrinal perspective, railguns illustrate both the promise and the difficulty of transformative naval technologies. They embody the aspiration for a weapon that could fundamentally alter layered defense and strike paradigms by combining hypersonic velocity, magazine depth, and affordability. Yet they also demonstrate the importance of aligning technological ambition with operational feasibility and platform integration. While railguns may not enter the fleet in the near term, the research conducted over two decades continues to shape the U.S. Navy’s pursuit of next-generation weapons, and the vision of electromagnetic naval firepower remains a long-term aspiration.

3.3 Electronic Warfare and Cyber Systems

Electronic warfare (EW) and cyber operations are now inseparable elements of naval combat power, with both domains shaping the character of maritime competition and conflict. While directed-energy weapons and hypersonics capture attention for their physical lethality, the less visible tools of spectrum dominance and cyber intrusion are often more decisive in achieving sea control. The U.S. Navy defines electronic warfare broadly across three pillars: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic support (Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command, 2016). These functions range from jamming adversary radars and communications to defending U.S. systems from interference and gathering intelligence from the electromagnetic environment. Cyber operations extend these capabilities into the digital terrain, where offensive actions can disable adversary command networks while defensive efforts secure the U.S. Navy’s own platforms and data infrastructure.

Modern surface combatants and submarines are built around integrated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems that depend on spectrum and network resilience. Naval Doctrine Publication 1 underscores that freedom of action in the maritime domain requires protecting the fleet’s ability to sense, communicate, and coordinate (Department of the Navy, 2020). In practice, this translates into layered EW and cyber defenses. Systems such as the AN/SLQ-32(V)7 Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) provide advanced electronic attack and protection capabilities. At the same time, the U.S. Navy’s Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems (CROWS) works to ensure the cyber survivability of critical combat systems. These capabilities are not ancillary but integral to the survival of ships and fleets, as adversaries are expected to attack sensors and networks well before launching kinetic salvos.

The doctrinal impact of EW and cyber systems is most evident in contested A2/AD environments. Adversaries such as China and Russia rely heavily on over-the-horizon radars, space-based ISR, and precision strike complexes to target U.S. forces. By disrupting adversary kill chains through jamming, spoofing, or cyber intrusion, the U.S. Navy can impose friction and delay on adversary decision-making. The 2020 Department of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy emphasized that control of the spectrum is no longer a supporting activity but a prerequisite for all-domain maneuver (Department of Defense, 2020). Naval forces that can deny adversaries reliable ISR while protecting their own networks maintain a disproportionate advantage in contested seas.

Cyber warfare further enhances this dynamic. As outlined in Joint Publication 3-12: Cyberspace Operations, the United States views cyberspace as both a warfighting domain and an enabler of other domains (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). For the U.S. Navy, this means that ships, submarines, and maritime operations centers are both instruments of cyber power and potential targets for cyber-attacks. Offensive cyber operations may disable adversary naval command systems, blind coastal surveillance radars, or corrupt targeting data. Defensive cyber measures must protect the U.S. Navy’s own networks, particularly Aegis combat systems, navigation, and satellite communications links. The U.S. Navy’s Cyberspace Superiority Vision outlines a pathway toward resilient, AI-assisted cyber defense, recognizing that the volume and speed of network attacks exceed human decision capacity (Department of the Navy, 2022).

The operational integration of EW and cyber warfare aligns with the U.S. Navy’s emphasis on DMO. By dispersing forces across vast areas, the fleet increases its survivability but also magnifies its dependence on secure and resilient communications. EW assets deployed across ships and aircraft can protect these communications while simultaneously denying adversaries the ability to coordinate their own dispersed forces. Cyber operations contribute by undermining the data integrity of adversary sensors and networks, further fragmenting their operational picture. Together, EW and cyber systems serve as force multipliers, shaping the battlespace so that directed-energy weapons, hypersonics, and traditional kinetic fires can be employed under favorable conditions.

For adversaries, these systems represent a persistent challenge. Both China and Russia have developed advanced EW capabilities, including GPS jamming, spoofing, and high-power electronic attack systems designed to degrade U.S. strike capabilities. Their doctrines emphasize the preemptive use of electronic and cyber-attacks to paralyze U.S. decision-making in the opening hours of conflict. The U.S. Navy’s investment in SEWIP upgrades, integrated EW suites for the F-35 and EA-18G Growler, and fleet-wide cyber resilience programs reflects an acknowledgment that electromagnetic and digital dominance is as critical to maritime superiority as guns, missiles, or lasers.

Ultimately, electronic and cyber warfare systems embody the U.S. Navy’s understanding that control over the intangible determines control over the tangible, such as ships, seas, and territory. They are enablers of deterrence, essential parts of layered defense, and, increasingly, the decisive tools in maritime competition below the threshold of open conflict.

SECTION 4: Tactical Doctrines for the Modern Navy

Naval doctrine evolves with technological advancements, and the introduction of directed-energy weapons, autonomous systems, hypersonics, and cyber-electromagnetic capabilities necessitates corresponding adaptations. The U.S. Navy’s framework of DMO reflects this shift. By dispersing combat power across wider areas and employing resilient networks, DMO allows massed effects without massed formations, preserving survivability against precision-strike complexes (U.S. Navy, 2018).

Directed-energy weapons contribute by adding a scalable, persistent defensive tier. HELIOS and follow-on systems enable ships to counter low-cost saturation threats without depleting missile magazines, supporting fleet-wide endurance (DOT&E, 2025). Autonomy extends distributed presence beneath the surface: Orca XLUUVs and REMUS-class UUVs provide ISR, sea denial, and mine warfare while reducing risk to human crews (CRS, 2025b). Hypersonics provide the offensive complement, with the U.S. Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program delivering long-range precision strike at ranges over 2,000 miles (CRS, 2024).

Electronic and cyber warfare underpin all of these capabilities. Spectrum dominance ensures that dispersed units remain connected while degrading the adversary’s kill chains. The Department of Defense’s Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy emphasizes that control of information and networks is a prerequisite for maneuver in all domains (Department of Defense, 2020). Cyber operations further complicate adversary planning by disrupting targeting and command networks while defending U.S. systems (Department of the Navy, 2022).

Taken together, these capabilities enable a new model of layered defense and offense. EW and cyber shape the environment; UUVs extend undersea reach; lasers defend distributed ships against massed low-cost threats; and hypersonics hold high-value targets at risk from standoff ranges. Doctrinally, this reflects a shift from reliance on a few high-capacity platforms to a resilient, networked force of manned and unmanned systems, empowered by emerging technologies and integrated under common command structures.

SECTION 5: Challenges and Limitations

Enduring challenges in technology, operations, and strategy temper the promise of advanced naval weaponry. Directed-energy weapons, autonomous undersea platforms, hypersonics, and cyber-electromagnetic systems all offer revolutionary potential. Yet, each faces hurdles that must be overcome before they can be integrated seamlessly into the fleet. These limitations reflect the gap between demonstrated capability and operational reliability, and they will influence the pace of adoption over the coming decade.

For directed-energy weapons, the central challenge lies in power and environmental constraints. Shipboard lasers such as HELIOS operate effectively at 60–120 kilowatts, enabling engagements against unmanned aerial systems and small boats. However, scaling to the hundreds of kilowatts necessary for cruise missile defense, and eventually megawatt-class systems to counter hypersonics, demands significant improvements in shipboard power generation and thermal management. Current Arleigh Burke destroyers cannot accommodate this requirement, and only future platforms, such as DDG(X), are designed with integrated power systems capable of supporting sustained high-energy laser operations. Moreover, atmospheric interference reduces beam quality and engagement ranges. While adaptive optics and beam control technologies can mitigate these effects, no system can eliminate environmental dependence, creating inherent operational uncertainty (CRS, 2024; Office of Naval Research, 2021).

Autonomous undersea vehicles face a different set of constraints. Underwater communications are limited by bandwidth, requiring UUVs to operate with infrequent or low-data-rate updates. This autonomy extends their endurance but complicates command and control, particularly in contested environments where situational awareness is essential. Cybersecurity is another vulnerability: unmanned platforms increase the U.S. Navy’s digital attack surface, and adversaries may try to disrupt or take control of autonomous systems through malware or electronic intrusion. Logistics and sustainment further limit effectiveness. While UUVs can patrol for weeks, they still need to be retrieved, refueled, or recharged, adding operational burdens in forward areas. Lastly, ethical and legal questions remain unresolved regarding the use of autonomous vehicles in lethal roles. International law, including the Law of Armed Conflict, has yet to provide clear guidance on accountability for autonomous weapons, and the U.S. Navy remains cautious about giving UUVs lethal authority without human oversight (CRS, 2025b).

Hypersonic weapons present both technical and strategic limitations. Technically, the extreme heat and stress generated at hypersonic speeds necessitate advanced thermal protection systems and hardened guidance electronics, which remain expensive and difficult to manufacture at scale. Launch integration is also constrained: only Zumwalt-class destroyers and Block V Virginia-class submarines have the space and power margins to deploy CPS in the near term, leaving the majority of the surface fleet unable to host these weapons. Strategically, hypersonics compress decision timelines and increase risks of miscalculation. The Congressional Budget Office (2023) has warned that adversaries may be unable to distinguish between conventional and nuclear hypersonic launches, raising the possibility of escalation even in conventional scenarios. Moreover, the cost of developing and deploying hypersonics remains high, with per-unit costs significantly higher than those of existing strike systems, raising concerns about affordability and scalability for fleet-wide use.

Electronic and cyber warfare systems, while integral to DMO, also face limitations. The electromagnetic spectrum is increasingly congested and contested, and adversaries possess advanced EW capabilities that can degrade or deny U.S. sensors and communications. Systems like SEWIP Block 3 provide powerful jamming and deception tools, but they remain dependent on resilient C4ISR networks vulnerable to cyber intrusion. Defensive cyber operations must contend with the reality that adversaries are continuously probing naval networks, and the U.S. Navy’s Cybersecurity Readiness Review in 2019 identified persistent shortfalls in fleet cyber resilience (U.S. Navy, 2019). Offensive cyber operations also face challenges of attribution, escalation, and legality, as actions in the digital domain can spill over into civilian infrastructure and draw strategic consequences beyond the battlefield.

Across all these systems, integration into fleet doctrine and training remains a consistent hurdle. Directed-energy operators require new technical expertise, UUVs demand new command-and-control structures, hypersonics require strategic planning for escalation management, and EW/cyber operations necessitate integration across joint and interagency partners. Doctrine lags behind technology, and the Navy must ensure that investments match investments in hardware in people, training, and operational concepts. Without this, new weapons risk becoming technological curiosities rather than integrated tools of maritime warfare.

Finally, there are strategic risks inherent in the pursuit of advanced weapons. Proliferation is a pressing concern. As the United States develops directed-energy and hypersonic systems, adversaries are investing in countermeasures and parallel programs. China’s advances in laser systems and hypersonics, Russia’s deployment of Tsirkon, and allied developments such as Israel’s Iron Beam underscore the likelihood of a competitive arms race. Escalation dynamics are equally complex. Employing non-kinetic tools such as lasers or cyber effects against adversary systems may provoke retaliatory actions in other domains. The Navy must therefore incorporate escalation planning into doctrine, ensuring that the tactical use of these systems aligns with broader strategic objectives (CRS, 2024; Department of Defense, 2020).

In summary, the limitations of advanced naval weapons are as critical to understanding their future as their capabilities. Power generation, environmental dependence, and barrel wear limit the effectiveness of directed energy and railgun systems—autonomy, communications, and legal ambiguity challenge UUV employment. Thermal stress, cost, and escalation risks complicate the deployment of hypersonic systems. Furthermore, EW/cyber systems, while indispensable, operate in an inherently contested and politically sensitive domain. Overcoming these limitations will require not only technological innovation but doctrinal adaptation, rigorous training, and careful management of strategic risks. Only by acknowledging and addressing these constraints can the Navy realize the full promise of its emerging arsenal.

SECTION 6: Future Directions

The trajectory of naval innovation suggests that directed-energy weapons, autonomous systems, hypersonics, and cyber-electromagnetic tools will move from niche programs to foundational elements of the fleet within the coming decade. The U.S. Navy’s challenge is not only to mature these technologies but to integrate them coherently into force design, doctrine, and alliance structures. Future directions, therefore, lie at the intersection of scaling technology, operationalizing autonomy, and ensuring ethical and legal frameworks keep pace with capability.

Directed-energy weapons will continue to increase in power through programs such as the High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative (HELSI) and the High Energy Laser Counter–anti–ship Cruise Missile Program (HELCAP). These initiatives aim to deploy lasers in the 300-kilowatt range by the late 2020s, with megawatt-class systems envisioned by 2030 (CRS, 2024). Such advances would allow fleet defense not only against drones and cruise missiles but also against hypersonic glide vehicles, fundamentally changing layered defense. Future combatants, such as DDG(X), designed with integrated power systems and better cooling, will serve as natural hosts for these weapons. Their deployment will mark the shift of lasers from tactical curiosities to central elements of naval defense systems.

Autonomous systems will expand both in scale and integration. Extra-large UUVs, such as the Orca, will mature into operational patrol and strike platforms, with modular payloads supporting ISR, mine warfare, and anti-submarine warfare missions. Medium and small UUVs will proliferate as attributable assets for distributed sensing. The U.S. Navy’s Unmanned Campaign Framework envisions swarming UUVs operating in coordinated networks, integrated with unmanned surface vessels and UAVs to provide a persistent presence across multiple domains (U.S. Navy, 2021). Achieving this vision requires not only technological maturity but also doctrinal adaptation. Command-and-control structures must evolve to incorporate unmanned systems as core fleet elements, while training pipelines prepare commanders to trust autonomy in contested waters.

Hypersonic weapons will remain central to the U.S. Navy’s strike modernization effort. By the late 2020s, Zumwalt-class destroyers and Virginia-class submarines are expected to deploy the Conventional Prompt Strike system, providing a global, sea-based hypersonic strike capability. Looking forward, DDG(X) and potentially Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines may also integrate CPS, creating a distributed, survivable arsenal of hypersonic weapons (U.S. Navy, 2023). The doctrinal future lies in integrating hypersonics into joint operations, where Army, Navy, and Air Force systems provide overlapping coverage. Allied collaboration, such as the U.S.–Australia SCIFiRE program, suggests a future where hypersonics are not solely American but embedded in coalition force design (Department of Defense [DoD], 2022).

Electronic and cyber warfare will increasingly define the conditions under which other systems can operate. The U.S. Navy’s Cyberspace Superiority Vision and the Department of Defense’s Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy stress that spectrum dominance is the foundation for maneuver in all domains (DoD, 2020; Department of the Navy, 2022). Future investments will focus on artificial intelligence–enabled spectrum management, resilient cyber defense, and integrated offensive cyber capabilities at the operational level. In practice, this means that every distributed force package under DMO will rely on secure, adaptive spectrum operations as much as on kinetic weapons.

Finally, ethical and legal frameworks must evolve alongside technology. The use of autonomous platforms in lethal roles, the escalation dynamics of hypersonics, and the proliferation of non-kinetic directed-energy weapons raise questions of accountability and compliance with international law. Future directions will require not only technical solutions but also the development of norms and treaties to manage competition. NATO efforts to standardize protocols for unmanned systems and U.S.–allied collaboration on laser and hypersonic weapons indicate that alliances will play a central role in shaping these norms (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2022).

The future of naval warfare is defined less by any single weapon than by the integration of diverse, emerging technologies into a distributed, networked, and resilient force. Directed energy, autonomy, hypersonics, and cyber-electromagnetic operations are converging into a hybrid arsenal that redefines both layered defense and long-range strike. The task ahead is to scale, integrate, and govern these systems in a way that ensures they enhance deterrence and warfighting capabilities without destabilizing the global order. The U.S. Navy’s future direction is therefore not merely technological but strategic—ensuring that innovation strengthens the enduring missions of deterrence, sea control, and power projection.

Conclusions

The balance between technological innovation and doctrinal adaptation has always defined the evolution of naval warfare. Directed-energy weapons, autonomous subsurface vehicles, hypersonics, and cyber-electromagnetic systems together represent the next decisive leap in this trajectory. Their combined effect is to extend the reach, resilience, and adaptability of naval forces, enabling a distributed and layered defense while projecting power at ranges and speeds once considered unattainable. Yet, these advances do not eliminate enduring challenges. Power generation, environmental constraints, communications bandwidth, and cybersecurity all impose limits, while the risk of escalation—particularly in hypersonic and cyber employment—demands careful integration into broader strategy.

As the Navy moves toward a hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned systems under DMO, the task is not merely to field new weapons but to embed them within doctrine, training, and alliance structures. Programs such as HELIOS, Orca, CPS, and SEWIP illustrate that the future fleet will not be defined by a single platform or capability but by the integration of diverse tools into a coherent operational concept. Success will depend on investments not only in technology but also in sailors, commanders, and institutions capable of leveraging these innovations responsibly.

The future maritime battlefield will be contested across the electromagnetic spectrum, sea, and cyberspace. Ensuring U.S. naval superiority in this environment requires sustained innovation, doctrinal flexibility, and strategic prudence. Advanced weapons are not ends in themselves but instruments to secure the enduring missions of deterrence, sea control, and power projection. Their promise will only be realized if the Navy aligns technology with doctrine and strategy, ensuring that these tools preserve stability even as they transform the character of naval war.

Questions to Consider

1. In what ways might the integration of directed-energy weapons, hypersonics, and autonomous systems reshape how the U.S. Navy organizes and fights in contested maritime environments?
2. How can electronic warfare and cyber operations strengthen distributed maritime operations, and what vulnerabilities might adversaries exploit in these domains?
3. What ethical and legal challenges arise when employing autonomous lethal systems or hypersonic weapons, and how should U.S. policymakers and naval leaders address them in strategy and doctrine?

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