10 Unprotected Categories: Defamation and other Torts
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
While libel and slander are the most well-known and frequently addressed torts that can cause First Amendment concerns, other types of lawsuits that could chill speech have also been addressed by the Court. In the remainder of this chapter, weâll look at two such torts: the intentional infliction of emotional distress and the publication of sensitive or embarrassing information. These lawsuits raise different concerns or harms than defamation torts; unlike libel and slander, the harms of both emotional distress and the violation of privacy are not directly connected to whether the speech in question was a false statement of fact. Despite these differences, the Court often applies the logic and even the doctrinal framework of its libel cases here, maintaining its concern that powerful figures could sue in order to discourage criticism or discussion of controversial subjects.
The intentional infliction of emotional distress tortâas the name suggestsâis generally defined as 1) outrageous conduct (including speech) that was 2) intended to cause and 3) does cause 4) severe emotional distress. Viewing this definition through the lens of our prior cases, itâs not hard to imagine a powerful plaintiff and a sympathetic jury using such torts to censor unpopular defendants who criticize them using offensive language. Moreover, such lawsuits could prove attractive because the plaintiff is not required to prove a false statement, as hyperbole or opinion could provide the necessary elements of the tort rather than being a disqualifying element.
The Court addressed emotional distress lawsuits in Hustler v. Falwell (1988), a case that pit a pornography publisher against a televangelist. Larry Flynt, Hustlerâs producer, had had a long-running feud with Jerry Falwell, a well-known television preacher who frequently targeted Flynt and his magazine for criticism. Campari, a liqueur company, had been running a series of advertisements about remembering the first time one had drank their product. Hustler produced a parody of the Campari ad campaign that detailed Falwellâs âfirst timeââexcept here the parody referred to Falwellâs first sexual experience. The ad parodyâwhich involved Falwellâs mother, a goat, an outhouse, and Campariâled to a series of lawsuits by Falwell against Flynt, including both a defamation lawsuit and an intentional infliction of emotional distress tort.
The jury rejected the libel claimâthe advertisement was clearly labeled as parody at the bottom of the textâbut awarded damages to Falwell under the intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress claim. Flynt appealed, with the case ultimately landing at the Supreme Court. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that public figures suing under an extreme emotional distress claim must also meet the Sullivan standard of actual malice to recover damages.
Hustler v. Falwell
485 U.S. 46 (1988)
Facts: Hustler magazine published a satirical liquor ad that implied Falwell had engaged in sexual relations with his own mother. Falwell sued Hustler in federal court (under diversity jurisdiction) for libel, invasion of privacy, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. While the jury rejected the first claim and the trial judge directed a verdict for Hustler in the second claim, Falwell won damages on the third tort.
Hustler appealed, arguing that the judgment violated its First Amendment rights. After losing on appeal, Larry Flynt (the publisher) appealed to the Supreme Court.
Question: Was Falwellâs parody protected by the First Amendment?
Vote: Yes, 8-0
For the Court: Justice Rehnquist
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Hustler Magazine, Inc., is a magazine of nationwide circulation. Respondent Jerry Falwell, a nationally known minister who has been active as a commentator on politics and public affairs, sued petitioner and its publisher, petitioner Larry Flynt, to recover damages for invasion of privacy, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court directed a verdict against respondent on the privacy claim, and submitted the other two claims to a jury. The jury found for petitioners on the defamation claim, but found for respondent on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and awarded damages. We now consider whether this award is consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
The inside front cover of the November, 1983, issue of Hustler Magazine featured a âparodyâ of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur that contained the name and picture of respondent and was entitled âJerry Falwell talks about his first time.â This parody was modeled after actual Campari ads that included interviews with various celebrities about their âfirst times.â Although it was apparent by the end of each interview that this meant the first time they sampled Campari, the ads clearly played on the sexual double entendre of the general subject of âfirst times.â Copying the form and layout of these Campari ads, Hustler’s editors chose respondent as the featured celebrity and drafted an alleged âinterviewâ with him in which he states that his âfirst timeâ was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. The Hustler parody portrays respondent and his mother as drunk and immoral, and suggests that respondent is a hypocrite who preaches only when he is drunk. In small print at the bottom of the page, the ad contains the disclaimer, âad parody — not to be taken seriously.â The magazine’s table of contents also lists the ad as âFiction; Ad and Personality Parody.â
Soon after the November issue of Hustler became available to the public, respondent brought this diversity action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against Hustler Magazine, Inc., Larry C. Flynt, and Flynt Distributing Co., Inc⌠The jury ⌠found against respondent on the libel claim, specifically finding that the ad parody could not âreasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated.â The jury ruled for respondent on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, however, and stated that he should be awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages, as well as $50,000 each in punitive damages from petitionersâŚ
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment against petitioners… because the jury found that the ad parody did not describe actual facts about respondent, [it held] the ad was an opinion that is protected by the First Amendment. As the court put it, this was âirrelevant,â as the issue is âwhether [the ad’s] publication was sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.â ⌠Given the importance of the constitutional issues involved, we granted certiorari.
This case presents us with a novel question involving First Amendment limitations upon a State’s authority to protect its citizens from the intentional infliction of emotional distress. We must decide whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused by the publication of an ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most. Respondent would have us find that a State’s interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved. This we decline to do.
At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concernâŚ
We have therefore been particularly vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed sanctionsâŚ
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold public office or those public figures who are âintimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.â ⌠Such criticism, inevitably, will not always be reasoned or moderate; public figures as well as public officials will be subject to âvehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.â
Of course, this does not mean that any speech about a public figure is immune from sanction in the form of damages ⌠we have consistently ruled that a public figure may hold a speaker liable for the damage to reputation caused by publication of a defamatory falsehood, but only if the statement was made âwith knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.â False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truthseeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective. But even though falsehoods have little value in and of themselves, they are ânevertheless inevitable in free debate,â and a rule that would impose strict liability on a publisher for false factual assertions would have an undoubted âchillingâ effect on speech relating to public figures that does have constitutional value. âFreedoms of expression require âbreathing space.ââ This breathing space is provided by a constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover for libel or defamation only when they can prove both that the statement was false and that the statement was made with the requisite level of culpability.
Respondent argues, however, that a different standard should apply in this case because, here, the State seeks to prevent not reputational damage, but the severe emotional distress suffered by the person who is the subject of an offensive publication. In respondent’s view, and in the view of the Court of Appeals, so long as the utterance was intended to inflict emotional distress, was outrageous, and did in fact inflict serious emotional distress, it is of no constitutional import whether the statement was a fact or an opinion, or whether it was true or false. It is the intent to cause injury that is the gravamen of the tort, and the State’s interest in preventing emotional harm simply outweighs whatever interest a speaker may have in speech of this type.
Generally speaking, the law does not regard the intent to inflict emotional distress as one which should receive much solicitude, and it is quite understandable that most, if not all, jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly culpable where the conduct in question is sufficiently âoutrageous.â But in the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment. âDebate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.â Thus, while such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about public figures.
Were we to hold otherwise, there can be little doubt that political cartoonists and satirists would be subjected to damages awards without any showing that their work falsely defamed its subject⌠The appeal of the political cartoon or caricature is often based on exploitation of unfortunate physical traits or politically embarrassing events — an exploitation often calculated to injure the feelings of the subject of the portrayal. The art of the cartoonist is often not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-sidedâŚ
Several famous examples of this type of intentionally injurious speech were drawn by Thomas Nast, probably the greatest American cartoonist to date, who was associated for many years during the post-Civil War era with Harper’s Weekly. In the pages of that publication Nast conducted a graphic vendetta against William M. âBossâ Tweed and his corrupt associates in New York City’s âTweed Ring.â It has been described by one historian of the subject as âa sustained attack which in its passion and effectiveness stands alone in the history of American graphic art.â Another writer explains that the success of the Nast cartoon was achieved âbecause of the emotional impact of its presentation. It continuously goes beyond the bounds of good taste and conventional manners.â
Despite their sometimes caustic nature, from the early cartoon portraying George Washington as an ass down to the present day, graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political debateâŚ
Respondent contends, however, that the caricature in question here was so âoutrageousâ as to distinguish it from more traditional political cartoons. There is no doubt that the caricature of respondent and his mother published in Hustler is at best a distant cousin of the political cartoons described above, and a rather poor relation at that. If it were possible by laying down a principled standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse would probably suffer little or no harm. But we doubt that there is any such standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative description âoutrageousâ does not supply one. âOutrageousnessâ in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An âoutrageousnessâ standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audienceâŚ
We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing, in addition, that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with âactual malice,â i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was trueâŚ
Here it is clear that respondent Falwell is a âpublic figureâ for purposes of First Amendment law. The jury found against respondent on his libel claim when it decided that the Hustler ad parody could not âreasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated.â The Court of Appeals interpreted the jury’s finding to be that the ad parody âwas not reasonably believable,â and, in accordance with our custom, we accept this finding. Respondent is thus relegated to his claim for damages awarded by the jury for the intentional infliction of emotional distress by âoutrageousâ conduct. But, for reasons heretofore stated, this claim cannot, consistently with the First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages when the conduct in question is the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody involved hereâŚ
Questions
1. What does it mean to apply the standards of Sullivan â a libel case â to offensive parodies? Is it possible for any parody to meet this standard when public figures are involved?
2. Rehnquist notes that parodies and humor are often part of political debateâto his discussion of political cartoons one might add skits from Saturday Night Live or stories in The Onion. Can you think of an example where humor was effectively used to make a political point? What about offensive humor?
3. Using logic similar to that of Justice Harlan in Cohen v. California, Rehnquist argues that âoffensivenessâ (a requirement of the tort) does not provide sufficient protection to speech in terms of limiting what speech is liable for damages. Do you agree? Is there another term or standard that might provide greater protection and allow the tort to survive? Can you think of situations â minors who are public figures, the death of a family member â that you would want to make âoff-limitsâ to parodic attacks?
Hustler effectively foreclosed public figures from recovering damages under intentional infliction of emotional distress torts. The Court revisited the issue two decades later following a successful emotional distress judgment against the Westboro Baptist Church. This church, led by the Phelps family, was notorious both for its extreme, reactionary positions on homosexuality as well as its tactics for gaining media attention. For a period of time, the church focused on picketing military funerals of soldiers killed in Iraq or Afghanistan, arguing that God had killed these soldiers because the United States was too tolerant towards homosexuals.
The 2011 case in questionâSnyder v. Phelpsâcame after Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church had picketed the funeral of Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, holding signs such as âThank God for dead soldiersâ and âThank God for IEDs,â as well as making comments on their website that Snyderâs parents had âraised him for the devil.â Snyderâs father sued for the intentional infliction of emotional distress (along with other privacy-related torts and defamation; the latter was dismissed for lack of false statements of fact) and won damages in federal court (under diversity jurisdiction). The Westboro Baptist Church won on appeal, with the Fourth Circuit holding that the churchâs picketing involved matters of public concern and was thus protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court took Snyderâs appeal, and by a vote of 8-1, extended Hustlerâs requirement that emotional distress torts meet actual malice to any speech involving matters of public concern.
Snyder v. Phelps
562 U.S. 443 (2011)
Facts: The Westboro Baptist Church picketed the funeral of Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder (on public property, 1000 feet from where the funeral was held). The family sued the church for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in federal court (under diversity jurisdiction), and was ultimately awarded $5 million in damages. The church won on appeal, and Snyder appealed to the Supreme Court.
Question: Does the First Amendment bar Marylandâs intentional infliction of emotional distress tort from being applied against the Westboro Baptist Church?
Vote: Yes, 8-1
For the Court: Justice Roberts
Dissenting opinion: Justice Alito
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
A jury held members of the Westboro Baptist Church liable for millions of dollars in damages for picketing near a soldierâs funeral service. The picket signs reflected the churchâs view that the United States is overly tolerant of sin and that God kills American soldiers as punishment. The question presented is whether the First Amendment shields the church members from tort liability for their speech in this case.
I
A
Fred Phelps founded the Westboro Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas, in 1955. The churchâs congregation believes that God hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in Americaâs military. The church frequently communicates its views by picketing, often at military funerals. In the more than 20 years that the members of Westboro Baptist have publicized their message, they have picketed nearly 600 funerals.
Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was killed in Iraq in the line of duty. Lance Corporal Snyderâs father selected the Catholic church in the Snydersâ hometown of Westminster, Maryland, as the site for his sonâs funeral. Local newspapers provided notice of the time and location of the service.
Phelps became aware of Matthew Snyderâs funeral and decided to travel to Maryland with six other Westboro Baptist parishioners (two of his daughters and four of his grandchildren) to picket. On the day of the memorial service, the Westboro congregation members picketed on public land adjacent to public streets near the Maryland State House, the United States Naval Academy, and Matthew Snyderâs funeral. The Westboro picketers carried signs that were largely the same at all three locations. They stated, for instance: âGod Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,â âAmerica is Doomed,â âDonât Pray for the USA,â âThank God for IEDs,â âThank God for Dead Soldiers,â âPope in Hell,â âPriests Rape Boys,â âGod Hates Fags,â âYouâre Going to Hell,â and âGod Hates You.â
The church had notified the authorities in advance of its intent to picket at the time of the funeral, and the picketers complied with police instructions in staging their demonstration. The picketing took place within a 10- by 25-foot plot of public land adjacent to a public street, behind a temporary fence. That plot was approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held. Several buildings separated the picket site from the church. The Westboro picketers displayed their signs for about 30 minutes before the funeral began and sang hymns and recited Bible verses. None of the picketers entered church property or went to the cemetery. They did not yell or use profanity, and there was no violence associated with the picketing.
The funeral procession passed within 200 to 300 feet of the picket site. Although Snyder testified that he could see the tops of the picket signs as he drove to the funeral, he did not see what was written on the signs until later that night, while watching a news broadcast covering the event.
B
Snyder filed suit against Phelps, Phelpsâs daughters, and the Westboro Baptist Church (collectively Westboro or the church) in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland under that courtâs diversity jurisdiction. Snyder alleged five state tort law claims: defamation, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. Westboro moved for summary judgment contending, in part, that the churchâs speech was insulated from liability by the First Amendment.
The District Court awarded Westboro summary judgment on Snyderâs claims for defamation and publicity given to private life, concluding that Snyder could not prove the necessary elements of those torts. A trial was held on the remaining claims. At trial, Snyder described the severity of his emotional injuries. He testified that he is unable to separate the thought of his dead son from his thoughts of Westboroâs picketing, and that he often becomes tearful, angry, and physically ill when he thinks about it. Expert witnesses testified that Snyderâs emotional anguish had resulted in severe depression and had exacerbated pre-existing health conditions.
A jury found for Snyder on the intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy claims, and held Westboro liable for $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damagesâŚThe District Court remitted the punitive damages award to $2.1 million, but left the jury verdict otherwise intact.
In the Court of Appeals, Westboroâs primary argument was that the church was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the First Amendment fully protected Westboroâs speech. The Court of Appeals agreed. The court reviewed the picket signs and concluded that Westboroâs statements were entitled to First Amendment protection because those statements were on matters of public concern, were not provably false, and were expressed solely through hyperbolic rhetoric.
We granted certiorari.
II
To succeed on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Maryland, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distressâŚ
Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case. â[S]peech on âmatters of public concernâ ⌠is âat the heart of the First Amendmentâs protection.ââ Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985). The First Amendment reflects âa profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.â New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) ⌠Accordingly, âspeech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.â
⌠Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can âbe fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,â or when it âis a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.â The arguably âinappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.â
Our opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, on the other hand, provides an example of speech of only private concern. In that case we held, as a general matter, that information about a particular individualâs credit report âconcerns no public issue.â âŚ
Deciding whether speech is of public or private concern requires us to examine the ââcontent, form, and contextââ of that speech, ââas revealed by the whole record.ââ Dun & Bradstreet, supra⌠In considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.
The âcontentâ of Westboroâs signs plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large, rather than matters of âpurely private concern.â ⌠While [the Churchâs] messages may fall short of refined social or political commentary, the issues they highlightâthe political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergyâare matters of public import. The signs certainly convey Westboroâs position on those issues, in a manner designed, unlike the private speech in Dun & Bradstreet, to reach as broad a public audience as possible. And even if a few of the signsâsuch as âYouâre Going to Hellâ and âGod Hates Youââwere viewed as containing messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically, that would not change the fact that the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboroâs demonstration spoke to broader public issues.
Apart from the content of Westboroâs signs, Snyder contends that the âcontextâ of the speechâits connection with his sonâs funeralâmakes the speech a matter of private rather than public concern. The fact that Westboro spoke in connection with a funeral, however, cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboroâs speech. Westboroâs signs, displayed on public land next to a public street, reflect the fact that the church finds much to condemn in modern society. Its speech is âfairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern,â and the funeral setting does not alter that conclusion.
Snyder argues that the church members in fact mounted a personal attack on Snyder and his family, and then attempted to âimmunize their conduct by claiming that they were actually protesting the United Statesâ tolerance of homosexuality or the supposed evils of the Catholic Church.â We are not concerned in this case that Westboroâs speech on public matters was in any way contrived to insulate speech on a private matter from liability. Westboro had been actively engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in its picketing long before it became aware of Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that Westboroâs picketing did not represent its âhonestly believedâ views on public issues. There was no pre-existing relationship or conflict between Westboro and Snyder that might suggest Westboroâs speech on public matters was intended to mask an attack on Snyder over a private matter.
Snyder goes on to argue that Westboroâs speech should be afforded less than full First Amendment protection ânot only because of the wordsâ but also because the church members exploited the funeral âas a platform to bring their message to a broader audience.â There is no doubt that Westboro chose to stage its picketing at the Naval Academy, the Maryland State House, and Matthew Snyderâs funeral to increase publicity for its views and because of the relation between those sites and its viewsâin the case of the military funeral, because Westboro believes that God is killing American soldiers as punishment for the Nationâs sinful policies.
Westboroâs choice to convey its views in conjunction with Matthew Snyderâs funeral made the expression of those views particularly hurtful to many, especially to Matthewâs father. The record makes clear that the applicable legal termââemotional distressââfails to capture fully the anguish Westboroâs choice added to Mr. Snyderâs already incalculable grief. But Westboro conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of public concern at a public place adjacent to a public street. Such space occupies a âspecial position in terms of First Amendment protection.â
⌠Westboroâs choice of where and when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the Governmentâs regulatory reachâit is âsubject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictionsâ that are consistent with the standards announced in this Courtâs precedents. Maryland now has a law imposing restrictions on funeral picketing. To the extent these laws are content neutral, they raise very different questions from the tort verdict at issue in this case. Marylandâs law, however, was not in effect at the time of the events at issue here, so we have no occasion to consider how it might apply to facts such as those before us, or whether it or other similar regulations are constitutionalâŚ
Simply put, the church members had the right to be where they were. Westboro alerted local authorities to its funeral protest and fully complied with police guidance on where the picketing could be staged. The picketing was conducted under police supervision some 1,000 feet from the church, out of the sight of those at the church. The protest was not unruly; there was no shouting, profanity, or violence.
The record confirms that any distress occasioned by Westboroâs picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral itself. A group of parishioners standing at the very spot where Westboro stood, holding signs that said âGod Bless Americaâ and âGod Loves You,â would not have been subjected to liability. It was what Westboro said that exposed it to tort damages.
Given that Westboroâs speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to âspecial protectionâ under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt. âIf there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.â
The jury here was instructed that it could hold Westboro liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a finding that Westboroâs picketing was âoutrageous.â âOutrageousness,â however, is a highly malleable standard with âan inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurorsâ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression.â Hustler. In a case such as this, a jury is âunlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of [the] speech,â posing âa real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of ⌠âvehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasan[t]ââ expression…
For all these reasons, the jury verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be set asideâŚ
III
⌠Snyder argues that even assuming Westboroâs speech is entitled to First Amendment protection generally, the church is not immunized from liability for intrusion upon seclusion because Snyder was a member of a captive audience at his sonâs funeral. We do not agreeâŚ
As a general matter, we have applied the captive audience doctrine only sparingly to protect unwilling listeners from protected speech. For example, we have upheld a statute allowing a homeowner to restrict the delivery of offensive mail to his home, and an ordinance prohibiting picketing âbefore or aboutâ any individualâs residence.
Here, Westboro stayed well away from the memorial service. Snyder could see no more than the tops of the signs when driving to the funeral. And there is no indication that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral service itself. We decline to expand the captive audience doctrine to the circumstances presented hereâŚ
IV
Our holding today is narrow. We are required in First Amendment cases to carefully review the record, and the reach of our opinion here is limited by the particular facts before usâŚ
Westboro believes that America is morally flawed; many Americans might feel the same about Westboro. Westboroâs funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its contribution to public discourse may be negligible. But Westboro addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials. The speech was indeed planned to coincide with Matthew Snyderâs funeral, but did not itself disrupt that funeral, and Westboroâs choice to conduct its picketing at that time and place did not alter the nature of its speech.
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, andâas it did hereâinflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different courseâto protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this caseâŚ
 JUSTICE BREYER, concurring.
⌠While I agree with the Courtâs conclusion that the picketing addressed matters of public concern, I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point…
The dissent recognizes that the means used here consist of speech. But it points out that the speech, like an assault, seriously harmed a private individual… The dissent requires us to ask whether our holding unreasonably limits liability for intentional infliction of emotional distressâto the point where A (in order to draw attention to his views on a public matter) might launch a verbal assault upon B, a private person, publicly revealing the most intimate details of Bâs private life, while knowing that the revelation will cause B severe emotional harm. Does our decision leave the State powerless to protect the individual against invasions of, e.g., personal privacy, even in the most horrendous of such circumstances?
As I understand the Courtâs opinion, it does not hold or imply that the State is always powerless to provide private individuals with necessary protection. Rather, the Court has reviewed the underlying facts in detail, as will sometimes prove necessary where First Amendment values and state-protected (say, privacy-related) interests seriously conflict. That review makes clear that Westboroâs means of communicating its views consisted of picketing in a place where picketing was lawful and in compliance with all police directions. The picketing could not be seen or heard from the funeral ceremony itself. And Snyder testified that he saw no more than the tops of the picketersâ signs as he drove to the funeral. To uphold the application of state law in these circumstances would punish Westboro for seeking to communicate its views on matters of public concern without proportionately advancing the Stateâs interest in protecting its citizens against severe emotional harm. Consequently, the First Amendment protects Westboro. As I read the Courtâs opinion, it holds no more.
JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting.
Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.
Petitioner Albert Snyder is not a public figure. He is simply a parent whose son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, was killed in Iraq. Mr. Snyder wanted what is surely the right of any parent who experiences such an incalculable loss: to bury his son in peace. But respondents, members of the Westboro Baptist Church, deprived him of that elementary right. They first issued a press release and thus turned Matthewâs funeral into a tumultuous media event. They then appeared at the church, approached as closely as they could without trespassing, and launched a malevolent verbal attack on Matthew and his family at a time of acute emotional vulnerability. As a result, Albert Snyder suffered severe and lasting emotional injury. The Court now holds that the First Amendment protected respondentsâ right to brutalize Mr. Snyder. I cannot agree.
I
Respondents and other members of their church have strong opinions on certain moral, religious, and political issues, and the First Amendment ensures that they have almost limitless opportunities to express their views. They may write and distribute books, articles, and other texts; they may create and disseminate video and audio recordings; they may circulate petitions; they may speak to individuals and groups in public forums and in any private venue that wishes to accommodate them; they may picket peacefully in countless locations; they may appear on television and speak on the radio; they may post messages on the Internet and send out e-mails…
It does not follow, however, that they may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution to public debateâŚ
This is a very narrow tort with requirements that âare rigorous, and difficult to satisfy.â To recover, a plaintiff must show that the conduct at issue caused harm that was truly severeâŚ
A plaintiff must also establish that the defendantâs conduct was ââso outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.ââ
Although the elements of the IIED tort are difficult to meet, respondents long ago abandoned any effort to show that those tough standards were not satisfied here. On appeal, they chose not to contest the sufficiency of the evidence⌠Instead, they maintained that the First Amendment gave them a license to engage in such conduct. They are wrong.
II
It is well established that a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress can be satisfied by speech⌠I think it is clear that the First Amendment does not entirely preclude liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress by means of speech.
This Court has recognized that words may âby their very utterance inflict injuryâ and that the First Amendment does not shield utterances that form âno essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.â Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942). When grave injury is intentionally inflicted by means of an attack like the one at issue here, the First Amendment should not interfere with recovery.
III
In this case, respondents brutally attacked Matthew Snyder, and this attack, which was almost certain to inflict injury, was central to respondentsâ well-practiced strategy for attracting public attention.
On the morning of Matthew Snyderâs funeral, respondents could have chosen to stage their protest at countless locations. They could have picketed the United States Capitol, the White House, the Supreme Court, the Pentagon, or any of the more than 5,600 military recruiting stations in this country⌠But of course, a small group picketing at any of these locations would have probably gone unnoticed.
The Westboro Baptist Church, however, has devised a strategy that remedies this problem. As the Court notes, church members have protested at nearly 600 military funerals. They have also picketed the funerals of police officers, firefighters, and the victims of natural disasters, accidents, and shocking crimes. And in advance of these protests, they issue press releases to ensure that their protests will attract public attention.
This strategy works because it is expected that respondentsâ verbal assaults will wound the family and friends of the deceased and because the media is irresistibly drawn to the sight of persons who are visibly in grief. The more outrageous the funeral protest, the more publicity the Westboro Baptist Church is able to obtain. Thus, when the church recently announced its intention to picket the funeral of a 9-year-old girl killed in the shooting spree in Tucsonâproclaiming that she was âbetter off deadââtheir announcement was national news, and the church was able to obtain free air time on the radio in exchange for canceling its protest. Similarly, in 2006, the church got air time on a talk radio show in exchange for canceling its threatened protest at the funeral of five Amish girls killed by a crazed gunman.
In this case, respondents implemented the Westboro Baptist Churchâs publicity-seeking strategy⌠This announcement guaranteed that Matthewâs funeral would be transformed into a raucous media event and began the wounding process. It is well known that anticipation may heighten the effect of a painful event.
On the day of the funeral, respondents, true to their word, displayed placards that conveyed the message promised in their press release. Signs stating âGod Hates Youâ and âThank God for Dead Soldiersâ reiterated the message that God had caused Matthewâs death in retribution for his sins. Others, stating âYouâre Going to Hellâ and âNot Blessed Just Cursed,â conveyed the message that Matthew was âin Hellâsine die.â
⌠Since respondents chose to stage their protest at Matthew Snyderâs funeral and not at any of the other countless available venues, a reasonable person would have assumed that there was a connection between the messages on the placards and the deceased. Moreover, since a church funeral is an event that naturally brings to mind thoughts about the afterlife, some of respondentsâ signsâe.g., âGod Hates You,â âNot Blessed Just Cursed,â and âYouâre Going to Hellââwould have likely been interpreted as referring to Godâs judgment of the deceasedâŚ
After the funeral, the Westboro picketers reaffirmed the meaning of their protest⌠Belying any suggestion that they had simply made general comments about homosexuality, the Catholic Church, and the United States military, the âepicâ addressed the Snyder family directly:
God blessed you, Mr. and Mrs. Snyder, with a resource and his name was Matthew. He was an arrow in your quiver! In thanks to God for the comfort the child could bring you, you had a DUTY to prepare that child to serve the LORD his GODâPERIOD! You did JUST THE OPPOSITEâyou raised him for the devil.
⌠In light of this evidence, it is abundantly clear that respondents, going far beyond commentary on matters of public concern, specifically attacked Matthew Snyder because (1) he was a Catholic and (2) he was a member of the United States military. Both Matthew and petitioner were private figures, and this attack was not speech on a matter of public concern. While commentary on the Catholic Church or the United States military constitutes speech on matters of public concern, speech regarding Matthew Snyderâs purely private conduct does notâŚ
IV
The Court concludes that respondentsâ speech was protected by the First Amendment for essentially three reasons, but none is sound.
Firstâand most importantâthe Court finds that âthe overall thrust and dominant theme of [their] demonstration spoke toâ broad public issues. As I have attempted to show, this portrayal is quite inaccurate; respondentsâ attack on Matthew was of central importance. But in any event, I fail to see why actionable speech should be immunized simply because it is interspersed with speech that is protected. The First Amendment allows recovery for defamatory statements that are interspersed with nondefamatory statements on matters of public concern, and there is no good reason why respondentsâ attack on Matthew Snyder and his family should be treated differently.
Second, the Court suggests that respondentsâ personal attack on Matthew Snyder is entitled to First Amendment protection because it was not motivated by a private grudge, but I see no basis for the strange distinction that the Court appears to draw⌠And as far as culpability is concerned, one might well think that wounding statements uttered in the heat of a private feud are less, not more, blameworthy than similar statements made as part of a cold and calculated strategy to slash a stranger as a means of attracting public attention.
Third, the Court finds it significant that respondentsâ protest occurred on a public street, but this fact alone should not be enough to preclude IIED liability. To be sure, statements made on a public street may be less likely to satisfy the elements of the IIED tort than statements made on private property, but there is no reason why a public street in close proximity to the scene of a funeral should be regarded as a free-fire zone in which otherwise actionable verbal attacks are shielded from liability⌠Neither classic âfighting wordsâ nor defamatory statements are immunized when they occur in a public place, and there is no good reason to treat a verbal assault based on the conduct or character of a private figure like Matthew Snyder any differently.
⌠funerals are unique events at which special protection against emotional assaults is in order. At funerals, the emotional well-being of bereaved relatives is particularly vulnerable. Exploitation of a funeral for the purpose of attracting public attention âintrud[es] upon their ⌠grief,â and may permanently stain their memories of the final moments before a loved one is laid to rest. Allowing family members to have a few hours of peace without harassment does not undermine public debate. I would therefore hold that, in this setting, the First Amendment permits a private figure to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by speech on a matter of private concern.
V
âŚ
VI
Respondentsâ outrageous conduct caused petitioner great injury, and the Court now compounds that injury by depriving petitioner of a judgment that acknowledges the wrong he suffered.
In order to have a society in which public issues can be openly and vigorously debated, it is not necessary to allow the brutalization of innocent victims like petitioner. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Questions
1. Was the Court correct, in your view, to hold that the Westboro Baptist Churchâs speech, in this case, was a âmatter of public concernâ? Look at both the descriptions of the signs as well as the discussion of the Church’s past actions and beliefs to help make your decision.
2. 48 of 50 states and the federal government filed amicus briefs supporting Snyder in this case, even as the Court ruled 8-1 for Phelps. Does this disparity undermine the majorityâs ruling on the proper balance between free speech and emotional harm? Support it?
3. Would you support â as many states adopted following this ruling â a time, place, and manner law that regulated speech during funerals? What might be some challenges in adopting such a statute?