13 What is “Religion”?

The Limits of “Religion” as a Category

Focusing on sincerity usually allows the Court to avoid having to decide the exact contours of “religion,” but not in all cases. What if someone makes a Free Exercise claim based on Kant’s philosophy or a set of ancient Greek ethical principles? While religion is difficult to define, if its domain includes all strongly held beliefs, the term becomes useless for protecting the specific belief system of “religion” that the Free Exercise clause was created to protect. This returns us to the original problem: how can we create criteria for recognizing religion without risking the exclusion of some religious beliefs?

There’s no perfect solution to this problem, but in a set of Vietnam War-era military draft objector cases, the Court formulated a partial answer. Federal law permitted individuals subject to the military draft to apply for conscientious objector status if they belonged to a religious sect—such as the Quakers or the Mennonites—that practiced pacifism (such individuals were given non-combatant roles or local service jobs, depending on the nature of their objection). However, if someone did not belong to such a sect, or had beliefs that appeared to be based on moral or ethical objections to war, draft boards might reject their applications. Such rejections often led to lawsuits, as refusing to enter the draft after rejection might mean a prison sentence.

The Vietnam War saw thousands of such objectors, many of whom did not belong to generally recognized pacifist denominations. Federal law at the time limited conscientious objector status to those who were opposed to war because of their “religious training and belief,” which was elsewhere defined as “belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”

In 1965, the Court heard a consolidated case involving three individuals whose applications for conscientious objector status had been rejected as not meeting the statute’s guidelines. Daniel Seeger, for example, had crossed out “training” from “religious training and belief” in his application and admitted he was agnostic as to whether he believed in a Supreme Being. Seeger’s application was denied, and he sued on the grounds that his denial (or the statute) violated the Free Exercise and Equal Protection clauses. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the statute but did so by construing its provisions broadly, effectively overturning the draft boards’ determinations.

United States v. Seeger

380 U.S. 163 (1965)

Facts: Seeger’s application for conscientious objector status was rejected by his draft board when he admitted he was an agnostic who did not believe in a Supreme Being. The draft board, applying federal law which suggested this was necessary to achieve such status, rejected his application. Seeger sued, arguing the denial violated his Free Exercise and Equal Protection rights.

Question: Did the religious exemption clause of the Military Training and Service Act violate the Free Exercise Clause?

Vote: No, 9-0

For the Court: Justice Clark

Concurring opinion: Justice Douglas

JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases involve claims of conscientious objectors under § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which exempts from combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States those persons who, by reason of their religious training and belief, are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. The cases were consolidated for argument, and we consider them together although each involves different facts and circumstances. The parties raise the basic question of the constitutionality of the section which defines the term “religious training and belief,” as used in the Act, as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”

The constitutional attack is launched under the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and is twofold: (1) the section does not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors; and (2) it discriminates between different forms of religious expression in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment…

We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression “Supreme Being,” rather than the designation “God,” was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views. We believe that, under this construction, the test of belief “in a relation to a Supreme Being” is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders, we cannot say that one is “in a relation to a Supreme Being” and the other is not…

Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of New York of having refused to submit to induction in the armed forces… He first claimed exemption as a conscientious objector in 1957, after successive annual renewals of his student classification. Although he did not adopt verbatim the printed Selective Service System form, he declared that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his “religious” belief; that he preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open, “rather than answer yes’ or `no’“; that his “skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God” did “not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever”; that his was a “belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed.” He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral integrity “without belief in God, except in the remotest sense.” His belief was found to be sincere, honest, and made in good faith, and his conscientious objection to be based upon individual training and belief, both of which included research in religious and cultural fields. Seeger’s claim, however, was denied solely because it was not based upon a “belief in a relation to a Supreme Being” as required by § 6(j) of the Act. At trial, Seeger’s counsel admitted that Seeger’s belief was not in relation to a Supreme Being as commonly understood, but contended that he was entitled to the exemption because, “under the present law, Mr. Seeger’s position would also include definitions of religion which have been stated more recently,” and could be “accommodated” under the definition of religious training and belief in the Act. He was convicted, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the section distinguished “between internally derived and externally compelled beliefs” …

Governmental recognition of the moral dilemma posed for persons of certain religious faiths by the call to arms came early in the history of this country. Various methods of ameliorating their difficulty were adopted by the Colonies, and were later perpetuated in state statutes and constitutions. Thus, by the time of the Civil War, there existed a state pattern of exempting conscientious objectors on religious grounds…

The crux of the problem lies in the phrase “religious training and belief,” which Congress has defined as “belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.” In assigning meaning to this statutory language, we may narrow the inquiry by noting briefly those scruples expressly excepted from the definition. The section excludes those persons who, disavowing religious belief, decide on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations that war is wrong and that they will have no part of it. These judgments have historically been reserved for the Government, and, in matters which can be said to fall within these areas, the conviction of the individual has never been permitted to override that of the state… We also pause to take note of what is not involved in this litigation. No party claims to be an atheist, or attacks the statute on this ground. The question is not, therefore, one between theistic and atheistic beliefs…

Few would quarrel, we think, with the proposition that in no field of human endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate in the communication of ideas as it has in dealing with the fundamental questions of man’s predicament in life, in death, or in final judgment and retribution. This fact makes the task of discerning the intent of Congress in using the phrase “Supreme Being” a complex one. Nor is it made the easier by the richness and variety of spiritual life in our country. Over 250 sects inhabit our land. Some believe in a purely personal God, some in a supernatural deity; others think of religion as a way of life envisioning, as its ultimate goal, the day when all men can live together in perfect understanding and peace. There are those who think of God as the depth of our being; others, such as the Buddhists, strive for a state of lasting rest through self-denial and inner purification; in Hindu philosophy, the Supreme Being is the transcendental reality which is truth, knowledge and bliss…

… it becomes readily apparent that the Congress deliberately broaden[ed] them by substituting the phrase “Supreme Being” for the appellation “God.” And, in so doing, it is also significant that Congress did not elaborate on the form or nature of this higher authority which it chose to designate as “Supreme Being.” By so refraining, it must have had in mind the admonitions of the Chief Justice when he said in the same opinion that even the word “God” had myriad meanings for men of faith…

… Under the 1940 Act, it was necessary only to have a conviction based upon religious training and belief; we believe that is all that is required here. Within that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these words: a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well established congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets…

Moreover, we believe this construction embraces the ever-broadening understanding of the modern religious community. The eminent Protestant theologian, Dr. Paul Tillich, whose views the Government concedes would come within the statute, identifies God not as a projection “out there” or beyond the skies, but as the ground of our very being…

We recognize the difficulties that have always faced the trier of fact in these cases. We hope that the test that we lay down proves less onerous. The examiner is furnished a standard that permits consideration of criteria with which he has had considerable experience. While the applicant’s words may differ, the test is simple of application. It is essentially an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption? …

In Seeger … the Court of Appeals failed to find sufficient “externally compelled beliefs.” However, it did find that “it would seem impossible to say with assurance that [Seeger] is not bowing to ‘external commands’ in virtually the same sense as is the objector who defers to the will of a supernatural power.”

It found little distinction between Jakobson’s devotion to a mystical force of “Godness” and Seeger’s compulsion to “goodness.” Of course, as we have said, the statute does not distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs. Such a determination would, as the Court of Appeals observed, prove impossible as a practical matter, and we have found that Congress intended no such distinction…

In summary, Seeger professed “religious belief” and “religious faith.” He did not disavow any belief “in a relation to a Supreme Being”; indeed, he stated that “the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence.” He decried the tremendous “spiritual” price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life. In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity with which he held them, we think the Board, had it applied the test we propose today, would have granted him the exemption…

JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.

The legislative history of this Act leaves much in the dark. But it is, in my opinion, not a tour de force if we construe the words “Supreme Being” to include the cosmos, as well as an anthropomorphic entity. If it is a tour de force so to hold, it is no more so than other instances where we have gone to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from demise on constitutional grounds…

The words “a Supreme Being” have no narrow technical meaning in the field of religion. Long before the birth of our Judeo-Christian civilization, the idea of God had taken hold in many forms. Mention of only two — Hinduism and Buddhism — illustrates the fluidity and evanescent scope of the concept. In the Hindu religion, the Supreme Being is conceived in the forms of several cult Deities…Though Hindu religion encompasses the worship of many Deities, it believes in only one single God, the eternally existent One Being, with his manifold attributes and manifestations…

Does a Buddhist believe in “God” or a “Supreme Being”? That, of course, depends on how one defines “God” …

… if “God” is taken to mean a personal Creator of the universe, then the Buddhist has no interest in the concept. But if “God” means something like the state of oneness with God as described by some Christian mystics, then the Buddhist surely believes in “God,” since this state is almost indistinguishable from the Buddhist concept of Nirvana, “the supreme Reality; . . . the eternal, hidden and incomprehensible Peace.” And, finally, if “God” means one of the many Deities in an at least superficially polytheistic religion like Hinduism, then Buddhism tolerates a belief in many Gods…

When the Congress spoke in the vague general terms of a Supreme Being, I cannot, therefore, assume that it was so parochial as to use the words in the narrow sense urged on us. I would attribute tolerance and sophistication to the Congress, commensurate with the religious complexion of our communities. In sum, I agree with the Court that any person opposed to war on the basis of a sincere belief, which, in his life, fills the same place as a belief in God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist, is entitled to exemption under the statute. None comes to us an avowedly irreligious person or as an atheist; one as a sincere believer in “goodness and virtue for their own sakes.” His questions and doubts on theological issues, and his wonder, are no more alien to the statutory standard than are the awe-inspired questions of a devout Buddhist.

The Court continues to maintain a fairly generous interpretation of religion when assessing who can benefit from the Free Exercise Clause. Another Vietnam War case, Welsh v. United States (1970), involved a litigant who pointedly rejected a belief in a supreme being on his conscientious objector application. The lower courts distinguished this case from Seeger on the grounds that Seeger’s beliefs had ultimately been religious while Welsh’s had not. The Supreme Court reversed, basically arguing that Welsh’s own description of his own beliefs was not a reliable guide for a legal test and that the nature of his objections was fairly similar to Seeger’s. At face value, this ruling appeared to put philosophic, moral, or ethical objections on the same plane as religious ones, at least in the context of conscientious objector cases.

However, the Court’s openness here was not unlimited. Just a year later, under a more conservative Court, the Court rejected the appeal of an objector whose objection was not to all wars, but to the Vietnam War in particular. While again a statutory case, not a constitutional one, the decision in Gillette v. United States (1971) suggested an outer limit on the Court’s acceptance of what claims could be deemed religious.

For the most part, however, while the exact contours of “religion” remain murky, the combination of the sincerity test and the Seeger test means that almost all litigants who make Free Exercise claims pass the initial threshold of citing “religious” beliefs burdened by some government action. The rare exception here may be criminal cases where the indicted claim religious belief in order to avoid prosecution, such as when a couple indicted for intent to distribute marijuana claimed they worshipped the drug as a deity (e.g. United States v. Quaintance, 523 F.3d 1144 (10^th Cir. 2010), but found their sincerity rejected by both the trial and appellate courts.