In peacekeeping, crisis management has become an increasingly key aspect of an MLT’s role. Crises are a regular feature of mission life. It is axiomatic that prevention through good analysis and intelligence can avoid some crises, but crises do happen. Many peace operations are on a virtually permanent crisis footing, making sound crisis-management procedures part of the normative framework for good mission leadership. Accordingly, good routine management is critical to successful mission crisis management.[1]
It is recognized that informed and effective leaders are the critical success factor in good crisis management. These leadership skills can only be developed by training and practice drills using sufficient resources in secure environments which focus on crisis preparedness. Preparedness requires clear policies and structures, clear roles and responsibilities, and understood and practised mechanisms for the fast flow of information and direction. None of these can be assumed, and it is usually too late to discover their absence in a crisis. The MLT has a central role in anticipating and preparing for crises, and ensuring all components are familiarized and practised in the use of the mission’s crisis management structures and procedures. It is equally important that all MLT members are well versed in the mission’s crisis-management procedures.
In moments of crisis, reliable reserve capacities are a vital but unmet requirement of UN peace operations. Even the best-prepared plans are ineffective in the absence of a credible response. When a political crisis erupts or serious violence breaks out, the UN must be able to react rapidly and effectively. It is critical that the mission HQ forges a unified political approach through the Crisis Management Team. While multiple initiatives will be essential, they should be mutually reinforcing.
Developing contingency plans and holding regular scenario-based exercises to increase the mission’s preparedness for handling crises is essential.[2] Because of the significantly reduced margin for error, the effectiveness of crisis response depends vitally on unity of information flow and unity of command.
UNAMID: Negotiating undeclared national caveats during crisis
There are instances when mission leadership must weigh the credibility of the mission in delivering its mandated task to protect civilians against the security of UN personnel. A critical question for mission leadership is negotiating undeclared national caveats by troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs) that come up during an operation or crisis.
For example, at one point during the mandate of the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), fighting between rebel groups and Sudanese security forces led to approximately 50,000 people fleeing towards the UNAMID Saraf Umra Team Site. The Team Site had a Military Company, 32 Individual Police Officers and several Military Observers and civilian staff. There was a risk that the displaced persons could force their way into the camp, and a threat of further attacks on the civilians. There was also a need for inner perimeter protection to identify the actual number of people and humanitarian needs.
During MLT deliberations on how to address the situation, several tensions arose. The MLT decided to deploy an additional Military Company to the Team Site as well as a platoon of formed police unit (FPU) personnel to assist with inner perimeter protection, and crowd management.
The FPUs had not previously deployed in such situations and when the decision was made to send a detached platoon, the PCC resisted and indicated that FPU platoons could not be detached from their unit. The political implications of potentially failing to protect civilians in Saraf Umra were significant and the mission would lose trust and any credibility with the local population it was mandated to serve.
Taking into consideration the protection needs on the ground and the memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the PCC, the MLT decided that the FPU platoon could be deployed after all for detached duties within a specific timeframe. As part of the security arrangements the FPU personnel moved together with the Military Company to provide inner perimeter protection and crowd management, while the military focused on outer perimeter protection and the gradual return of the displaced persons.
It was important for UNAMID to have considered the implications and consequences of the situation. Several questions arose, for example regarding the interpretation of detached duties of an FPU and the MOU between the UN and the PCC, while credibly implementing the mission mandate. All this was when time for MLT decision-making was short. It was therefore important for the MLT to have a deep understanding of the competing issues and in the face of such polarities to make decisions accordingly.
Brig. Gen. Hester Paneras, Police Commissioner, UNAMID, 2013–15
- UN Evaluation Report, 'Contingency Planning and Crisis Preparedness in UN Peacekeeping Operations', January 2018. ↵
- UN DPO, ‘Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business’ [Santos Cruz report], 19 December 2017. ↵