Threats to the peace process come from a variety of sources. Spoilers are agents, organizations or factions that work against the peace process and threaten the success of a UN mission. Working sometimes in tandem, but also independently, spoilers perceive the peace process as threatening their world view, power or interests (often financial) and are willing to use both violent and non-violent means to achieve their objectives.

Spoilers can be domestic or international and can include but are not limited to violent extremists and terrorists, criminals (both organized and unorganized) and warring factions. Conflict zones are politicized regions of insecurity that can be conducive to various types of spoilers (political, ideological and criminal) that may lead to armed violence.

Managing threats from these spoilers requires the development of discrete strategies to address each type based on a deep understanding of their intentions, motivations, level of commitment and interactions (see 2.2 Promoting Integrated Planning and Operations on page 31, and the subsection on context analyses). In addition to understanding the goals of spoilers, the mission must understand their political/social strategy and financial strategy, as well as the networks in which they operate, their leadership and organizational structures, the interrelationships among spoiler groups and the decision-making process. Spoilers can be categorized according to: (a) their relationship to the peace process; (b) their willingness to negotiate in the context of the peace process; and (c) their willingness to use violence.

Distinguishing between spoilers

Relationship to the peace process

Spoilers can be inside or outside of the peace process. Inside spoilers are part of the host government or a party to an agreement that has failed to abide by that agreement and places obstacles in the path of the process that prevent the UN mission from carrying out its mandate.

Outside spoilers have not signed up or agreed to the peace process and can use any means to prevent that process from succeeding. Some outside spoilers are conflict entrepreneurs, whose commitments to ending conflict are subordinate to their lucrative exploitation of the conflict. All of these spoilers can be empowered by existing criminal power structures and linkages to transnational organized crime. Each presents different challenges for the MLT.

Willingness to negotiate

Another type of spoiler may have limited goals, such as power sharing, redressing grievances, security or access to resources. Such spoilers are willing to negotiate to achieve these goals in the context of a peace process. The peace process may have to be adjusted to accommodate their goals. Other spoilers may seek total power based on ideological or religious views that are non-negotiable and outside of the peace process. Conflict entrepreneurs will evaluate the costs and benefits to determine which negotiation path provides them with the most lucrative outcome or if they must seek to obtain their goals through intimidation (see 3.2 Peace Process Supported on page 66).

Willingness to use violence

Some spoilers may not be willing to negotiate, may be driven by ideological or religious goals or may have had their criminal enterprises put at risk. This type of spoiler is more likely to use force than other types – a factor which must be considered when designing operational approaches. The way in which force is used should also be considered. An ideological or religiously driven spoiler may be using force in a manner consistent with IHL while remaining unwilling to negotiate and may therefore be seen as continued armed opposition.

Alternatively, a spoiler may use force with complete disregard for IHL and with the deliberate intent of creating fear through unpredictability (e.g. in terms of targeting), which would mean an indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force. Non-state groups using force in the pursuit of ideological or religious goal, with disregard for IHL and with the deliberate intent of creating fear, are sometimes referred to as terrorists. While a UN mission is not mandated to conduct counterterrorist operations, it is increasingly recognized that UN missions can be targets of terrorist activity and need to be able to protect themselves and their staff from it.

Operational approaches

The operational approach must not only address each type of spoiler, but also embrace the context in which they operate and the connections that empower and facilitate them. It must be understood that in some areas spoilers may be networked and operate in symbiotic relationships, therefore requiring the networking of mitigation efforts. In addition to considering each type of spoiler, MLTs, through the JMAC, must look for and exploit the critical nodes where criminality, extremism and politics intersect. This requires the integration of intelligence, law- enforcement, political, diplomatic and development resources. Credible local institutions must be harnessed and supported. These approaches must be based on sound and deep intelligence as well as the sharing of information widely among all actors that can understand the nodal relationships among all of the spoilers. All operational approaches require integration not only at the mission level, but also in the host state and among other international actors outside the mission. All approaches must devise a robust strategic communications plan that addresses the social narratives that support extremism. The basic concept is to combine proactive, reactive and consequence- management measures to undermine the incentives for violence while promoting alternatives paths.

Proactive measures

Use positive measures to engage with spoilers and address their goals; strengthen or build accountable host-state institutions; preserve political momentum; deconstruct spoiler narratives and develop supportive narratives; create or support social educational programmes; engage with religious leaders and communities; engage with civil society with a focus on women and youth; strengthen and reform economic and financial institutions to include anti-corruption efforts; run a viable SSR and DDR programme; and secure borders and gain support from external neighbours.

Reactive measures

Use the integrated assets of the mission and national structures to weaken, persuade, compel and neutralize spoilers. Consider the appropriate combination of strategic communications, and diplomatic, political, economic, legal, law-enforcement and military means.

Consequence-management measures

Such measures address the social, economic, religious and political consequences of extreme spoiler acts.

Impact of transnational organized crime mitigated

Transnational organized crime (TOC) is more than a law-enforcement problem. Structured groups that commit serious crimes in the mission area for financial or other material benefit are a threat, and risk delaying or derailing both the mission and the peace process. TOC threatens the general security environment, state legitimacy (through corruption) and the legitimacy of the government when it is perceived to be beholden to criminal groups. Actors engaged in TOC may even be part of the government the mission is seeking to reform.

Therefore, an effective response to TOC requires a comprehensive and multi-stakeholder approach, in which the mission will be an important actor. The main focus of the mission’s activity will be to build capacity in the host country to mitigate the negative impact of TOC. The MLT might be asked to coordinate the activities of many stakeholders, including the host government and its relevant agencies, as well as regional and international organizations. In the past, many mission leaders ignored TOC and by the time it was recognized, it was extremely difficult to counter its negative impact. It is therefore extremely important that the MLT considers preventive measures early on to mitigate the impact of TOC.

4.4.1 Operational activities

The mission’s operational activities to support this output include:

• Identifying the different spoilers and understanding the connections between them.
• Engaging civil society, media, religious leaders and communities with a focus on women and youth.
• Conducting strategic communications to deconstruct spoiler narratives while developing supportive narratives.
• Reaching out to spoilers who are ready for negotiation and reconciliation.
• Assisting in identifying and developing mitigation strategies on TOC (including corruption and terrorism) with the host state.
• Soliciting internal and external support and resources, such as intelligence sharing, and establishing operational planning and coordination mechanisms with external actors.

4.4.3 Responsibilities and coordination

The host government is responsible for developing its capacity and capability to address spoilers, with the support of the mission, relevant UN agencies and international stakeholders. However, until the national authorities can fully assume this responsibility and be trusted by the population to deliver, the peacekeeping mission may be expected to deal with a range of spoiler issues, in close coordination with national security institutions. The DPO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) will be a key player in providing support to the mission in these areas. To be successful, strategic communications must be a focus of the MLT and coordinated at all levels.

Close cooperation should be promoted between the situational- awareness and analytical capabilities of the JOC, JMAC, UNPOL’s criminal intelligence cell, and military intelligence (U2) branch, and where appropriate engage in information sharing with regional partners.

4.4.4 Resources

The mission – and in particular the JMAC, Military and Police components – should have sufficient training, capacity and capability, along with the appropriate ROE, to deal with spoiler challenges. SSR and DDR are central elements and will therefore require adequate funding and support from donors. Resources may also be required to develop penal, police and judicial facilities and sites. Conducting strategic communications to deconstruct spoiler narratives while developing supportive narratives will require investment in personnel and equipment as well as a focus by the MLT. Engaging with civil society institutions to build resilience should also be a focus of mission resources, along with educational programmes and consequence- management initiatives to heal communities after violent attacks.

Where possible, the MLT should consider reaching out to neighbouring and regional countries, as well as the wider UN system (e.g. the UN Office of Counter Terrorism and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime) and external organizations such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to ensure cooperation and support on intelligence, planning and operational activities. These could provide valuable yet low-cost resources (including data, analysis and coordination mechanisms) for combating TOC.