A peace operation can only succeed if the conflict parties are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a peaceful political process. A mission deployed in the absence of such a commitment runs the risk of becoming paralyzed or, worse still, being drawn into the conflict. The signing of a ceasefire or peace agreement is an important indicator of whether the parties are ready to engage in political dialogue. At times, however, agreements are signed as a result of international pressure.

The true worth of an agreement lies in its level of implementation. Negotiating a political settlement is usually a complex and delicate process. The content of the settlement is likely to determine the challenges that will arise during the implementation phase. There may be immediate windows of opportunity to address transitional justice that close later. Relevant senior leaders, particularly the DSRSG, should be part of any initial transitional justice discussions between the justice and human rights sections. More broadly, in some instances there may be tensions between the need for frank reporting on human rights issues and the overall objective of advancing the peace process.

It is essential that women and youth are able to meaningfully participate in the peace process, as both victims of conflict and important drivers of recovery and development. The MLT should meet regularly and maintain dialogue with women and youth groups, local communities and civil society more broadly to establish a transparent dialogue on gender-related issues within the peace process. The MLT should also engage with the national authorities and advocate the importance of gender equality and women’s participation in national institutions and political and electoral processes. Peace will only be sustainable if women are included, feel secure and have their human rights upheld and protected. The MLT has an obligation to lead by example and to champion policies and strategies – both within the mission and in all dealings with national and local authorities – that incorporate gender and youth perspectives at the political and organizational levels. This includes leveraging political engagement at the highest political levels, particularly with the host authorities.

Contemporary conflicts are often marked by a fluid constellation of actors. In some cases, spoilers may emerge to obstruct or derail the peace process. Spoilers are actors who believe that the “peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests”.[1] They can range from sceptics of the peace agreement or political pro-ess, to terrorist groups who use violence to undermine the implementation of the peace agreement. Such spoilers may be found at all levels, and both inside and outside the forum of peace negotiations. It is important to understand the motives of sceptics, and even the less committed spoilers that may change their position, so as to engage them in the peace process and strengthen their incentives for supporting a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict. Spoilers that use violence are often represented as non-state armed groups (NSAGs), a subset of which are “proscribed armed groups”, often labelled as terrorist groups. It is common for national and international organizations to prohibit political engagement with such groups even though they are stakeholders in the conflict and have established viable relationships with local communities (see 4.5 Public Order Established).[2]

It is important to note that UNHQ has recently developed guidance that allows for engagement with NSAGs to enable peace operations to support the political process and carry out their protection mandates.[3]

If or when members of the MLT are involved in negotiating settlements, a number of issues should be considered:

  • The political and military strengths of the parties are often unequal.
  • Those who support the political process should be supported to capitalize on the drivers for peace identified in the previous analysis.
  • The structural causes of the conflict must be addressed; these tend to be pervasive and include long-standing factors and differences that have permeated the politics and culture of a society.
  • Interest-based causes are likely to exacerbate a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation in competition for resources.
  • While the symptoms of these causes of conflict may have to be dealt with in the short term, their solutions require thorough analysis and a long-term, structured approach.
  • As with structural, intermediate and immediate causes and drivers of conflict, the mission must also explore the drivers or causes for peace that exist in societies, including, for example, traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms. Actors with an interest in changing the narrative of conflict from the use of violence to the use of accepted resolution mechanisms need to be engaged at the national, regional or community level.
  • Disagreements over implementation – especially with regard to sensitive processes such as SSR/DDR and power- and resource-sharing – can undermine peace processes.
  • Unrealistic goals and timetables can complicate or undermine implementation; realistic, measurable goals that enhance accountability are preferable.
  • Without host-government leadership, local politicians and leaders might conduct their affairs while disregarding the peace process. Hence, it is essential to map and understand the interests and incentives of key stakeholders.
  • Political processes should include all parties with the power or ability to cause violent obstruction, as well as marginalized groups such as women and minorities who may have been victimized or excluded in the past.
  • The active engagement of the civilian population through public dialogue and civil society mechanisms is a key factor in the success of any peace process.
  • Any peace process must be supported by an effective strategic communication plan that helps to deliver credible and easily understood messages about the objectives of the process and is able to manage expectations about the pace and dividends of its implementation.

3.2.1 Operational activities

The operational activities of the mission to support this output include:

  • Establishing confidence-building measures.
  • Utilizing the instrument of peace and conflict analysis at the national (and, where applicable, local) level, to understand the drivers of peace and conflict and the interests of key stakeholders.
  • Ensuring the political strategy is informed by continuous analysis to explore opportunities and manage obstructions to peace.
  • Analysing the influence of neighbouring and regional activities on the political dynamics in the host country.
  • Developing strategic partnerships with influencing parties who have leverage over others, in order to create and sustain space for the peace process.
  • Addressing political tensions at the community level, in close cooperation with the UNCT, and supporting local conflict-resolution initiatives.
  • Ensuring the inclusion of women and youth in the peace process.
  • Establishing a strategic communication strategy.
  • Establishing verification mechanisms to ensure compliance and deal with violations.
  • Ensuring that the political process addresses social cohesion, inequalities and marginalization and contributes to a more sustainable peace.

3.2.2 Benchmarks

Short-term

  • Ceasefire and/or peace agreements signed, and compliance mechanisms established.
  • Joint confidence-building measures implemented.
  • Strategic communication strategy planned.
  • Marginalized groups are represented in the peace process.

Medium-term

  • Established mechanisms for resolving disputes are being used, and violence against civilian population and institutions is decreasing.
  • Factions are communicating with each other in a productive dialogue.
  • The population considers that it is being included in the process, as verified by various polling and survey tools.
  • The ability to provide basic policing, security and justice functions is developed.
  • The number of violations is decreasing, and their severity is at such a level that they can be partly managed by the national authorities.
  • The host government is able to extend its authority to large parts of the country.

Long-term

  • The use of political violence has ceased.
  • Governmental institutions are addressing grievances and implementing a transitional justice process.
  • The rule of law is respected by the population and governmental institutions are abiding by it.

3.2.3 Responsibilities and coordination

The roles of the mission in and its responsibilities to the peace process need to be clearly spelled out and widely communicated. The MLT should allocate time to gain an understanding of peace and conflict dynamics and drivers, as well as the interests of the various adversaries. Within the mission, the HoM is responsible for all efforts pertaining to the political aspects of the peace process. The HoM and relevant members of the MLT should be constantly involved in the political process, in close consultation with UNHQ and the facilitators and/or guarantors of the peace agreement. It is important that senior military and police commanders work under the SRSG’s direction when supporting the political process. Close coordination between the political, military and police components is crucial in this respect, not least when establishing and applying dispute-resolution mechanisms.

3.2.4 Resources

Sufficient resources must be allocated to support the mandated tasks, including adequate communications and key experts who can conduct sensitive negotiations and assess compliance. DPPA’s Mediation Support Unit (MSU) can be called on to enhance the mission’s capacity to conduct and support negotiations. The MSU can help support mission leaders and train their teams (including Political and Civil Affairs Officers) in negotiation and mediation techniques, and strengthen local dispute-management capacities through its own work and that of its partners. The long-term success of a political process will also depend on marshalling donors to provide the financial and material support required to keep the process on track.

3.2.5 Challenges and risks

  • Lack of political will in the peace process or withdrawal of consent by one or more of the major parties.
  • Parts of the population feel excluded or marginalized from the peace process.
  • The expectations of the population, including those of former belligerents, are not met in a timely manner.
  • The peace process does not sufficiently address the structural causes of the conflict nor does it explore the drivers of peace already existing in society.
  • Lack of national ownership of the process.
  • Lack of political will and/or engagement on the part of the international community, and at times having to reconcile competing regional interests with the Security Council mandate.
  • Regional developments or instability spill over or have a negative impact on the peace process.
  • Limited capacity within host government’s national authorities.
  • Lack of understanding in the population of the role of the UN in the peace process, particularly its limitations.

3.2.6 Considerations

Peace accords lay out long-term roadmaps for sustainable peace and achieving state resilience but, beyond statements about reform, they often leave details related to the machinery of government relatively vague. Several trade-offs should be considered.

Balancing short- and long-term needs

The short-term need to provide security and basic services usually takes precedence over long-term development and issues of governance. Initially, engagement with the host government tends to focus on the agencies responsible for security and service delivery. To achieve long-term governmental effectiveness and sustainability, however, other functional executive agencies such as ministries of finance, planning and trade need to be included, along with legislative bodies. In addition, to put in place the building blocks for responsive and representative government, avenues for citizen participation need to be opened up sooner rather than later. The peace process needs to balance these needs, and the mission should be aware of what is being negotiated, as this will affect its concept of operations.

Addressing urgent needs while fostering state legitimacy

A related trade-off is between meeting urgent needs and fostering the legitimacy of state institutions. It is important to find ways to include public agencies and officials in planning, budgeting and decision making so that citizens perceive their government as responsive to their needs and those of the country.

However, the government’s capacity is likely to be weak, or else high-level officials may be more interested in political power and patronage than in effectively fulfilling their service-delivery responsibilities. The mission needs to balance its urgent support for local authorities against ensuring that its partners are developing legitimate capacities and have not committed egregious human rights violations.

Weighing specificity against ambiguity

Another trade-off is between specificity on key provisions that are likely to be contentious and vagueness that allows the process and negotiations to mature. Efforts to push towards specificity may lead political actors and their supporters to entrench themselves behind firm positions, which can delay implementation of peace agreements and even reignite violence. Without political structures and procedures that enable actors to work out ambiguities and disagreements peacefully, vague and ambiguous provisions may sow the seeds of future governance problems. However, if the focus is on interests rather than political positions, specificity may not be a problem as a detailed focus may prevent later complications or disagreements.


  1. Stephen J. Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', International Security, 22/2 (Fall 1997).
  2. Ralph Mamiya, ‘Engaging with non-state armed groups to protect civilians: A pragmatic approach for UN Peace Operations’, International Peace Institute, October 2018.
  3. UN DPKO and UN DFS, ‘Aide Memoire: Engaging Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGS) for Political Purposes’, 2017 [internal document].

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Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peace Operations Copyright © 2021 by International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations. All Rights Reserved.

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