While not applicable in all situations, separating forces reduces tensions so that continued negotiations, cooperation and implementation of a peace process can proceed. The separation of warring parties involves establishing distinct areas of control that keep factions apart, and allows the peacekeeping force to monitor their actions. This helps limit civilians’ exposure to conflict and asserts control over armed forces, thereby building confidence in the peace process. The separation of combatants should be followed by observation and monitoring of a ceasefire.
Establishing control and preventing large-scale fighting demonstrates the authority and forcefulness of the mission and generates credibility, which will set the tone for future actions and compliance by the parties. The role of the peacekeeping force in ensuring stability is vital until the national authorities are capable of providing security.
The nature of the conflict will determine the disposition of separation, varying from buffer zones (e.g. in interstate conflicts or secessionist intra-state conflicts) to areas or zones of separation that create a neutral space or “no-man’s land” (e.g. in some internal conflicts where combatants and civilians intermingle). The boundaries and entry points of these zones should be agreed on by all parties, clearly marked, and identifiable on a map or formal record. In the final analysis, ending armed conflict and securing long-term peace require political, not military solutions.
4.1.1 Operational activities
The key operational activities by the mission to support this output include:
- Deployment of troops and UN police to zones of separation.
- Deployment of UN police and formed police units (FPUs) in population centres.
- Establishing joint confidence- and security-building measures for monitoring compliance with a ceasefire or other military agreement, and improving coordination through liaison officers or joint commissions.
- Establishing control measures for the separation of forces, weapons and ammunition, equipment, and the movement of personnel.
4.1.2 Benchmarks
Short-term
- Mechanisms for implementing security arrangements are established and functioning.
- The mission’s strategic communications strategy is implemented.
- Control measures are in place.
- Monitoring is in place and functioning.
- DDR programmes have been planned and implementation has started.
- The mission supports SSR discussions among key national stakeholders and preparations are made for an initiation of a SSR process, if applicable.
- Priority mine action tasks completed, if applicable.
Medium-term
- Continued implementation of DDR.
- A national SSR programme is being implemented.
- All factions separated and complying with the control measures.
- All designated weapons have been cantoned in accordance with relevant agreements and the DDR programme.
- Factions are complying with the security provisions of the peace agreement.
- Incidents of violence involving former combatants are significantly reduced.
Long-term
- Factions have been integrated and are part of the government process.
- Factions refrain from using violence to settle grievances or gain political power.
- The security situation is conducive to the return of IDPs and refugees.
- Final phases of DDR are being implemented.
- SSR programmes consolidated and yielding long-term results with support of all key stakeholders.
4.1.3 Responsibilities and coordination
Separating warring factions requires that the HoM make significant efforts to keep all belligerents engaged in the process. The FC will have responsibility for monitoring compliance with security arrangements in accordance with the mission’s mandate. If the peace operation is taking over responsibility from another force, the MLT (in particular the SRSG and the FC) should ensure that the transition is closely coordinated with the DPO and the DOS, as well as the authorities responsible for the previous force. Joint mechanisms should be established to coordinate with factions.
4.1.4 Resources
Timely deployment of the mission’s uniformed personnel requires adequate resources, with sufficient capacity and capability and with the appropriate directives to establish control measures. The mission should also have access to suitable technology for surveillance and monitoring compliance, either through TCCs/PCCs or through contracted services. Experts should be recruited to support the DDR and SSR processes at a time when the conditions are right.
4.1.5 Challenges and risks
- Compliance is not universal, or factions do not respect all the elements of the relevant agreements.
- Fragmented/renegade/spoiler groups continue fighting, or the peace process/agreement fails and conflict resumes.
- Conflict spreads beyond the borders of the mission area.
- Regional or other transnational actors subvert the peace process.
- The impartiality of the mission is compromised by apparent or perceived support of one party over another.
- The peacekeeping force is unable to accomplish its mandate due to operational inflexibility and restrictions, undeclared national caveats (restrictions placed by TCCs on the use of their force) or lack of capability, capacity and training.
- Lack of political ownership for the necessary reforms within the police, security and justice institutions.
4.1.6 Considerations
Mission posture
Separating warring factions may, in some circumstances, require the use of force, especially where spoilers are present and/or a culture of impunity is prevalent. While assertive action ensures credibility, excessive force might jeopardize the legitimacy of the mission and alienate certain groups or enable spoilers to rally the population against the intervention. Finding a way to balance this trade-off is essential and may involve the engagement of the police component through the deployment of FPUs that are proficient in the use of lethal and less-lethal force against non-military threats. Because peace is fragile at this stage, the impact of all actions and the risks of reigniting conflict should be carefully assessed. Understanding and exercising the principles of impartiality and consent is essential, as is the availability of a range of both lethal and non-lethal capabilities.
Area deployment or point defence
Force levels in peacekeeping operations are almost never sufficient for the scale and number of tasks. The military component is usually spread very thinly over large areas and it is hard to concentrate force. Additionally, much military capability is taken up by self-protection of the mission and its vulnerable bases. The extent to which the mission concentrates on defending points and bases or providing wide area security is a balance of judgement between spreading forces so thinly that they are ineffective or, conversely, concentrating them in a few key areas and leaving parts of the country and civilians unprotected. In practice a mission must be able to do both and have the intelligence and flexibility to recalibrate and redeploy to counter new threats. A similar dilemma is faced by UNPOL in its deployment of FPUs. A balance must be struck between their public order policing tasks and their deployment in place of the military for security duties.