Freedom of movement entails the free flow of people and goods without fear of physical harm or disruption. At the same time, illicit commodities and other sources of instability must have their movement disrupted. Free movement promotes the normalization of daily life and economic growth, such as access to schools and markets, as well as the social integration of isolated communities.
Freedom of movement can be challenged by various factors, including hostilities between warring factions; the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by one or more parties; natural disasters; and an uncooperative host state. Hostilities between parties are likely to prevent movement of the civilian population and can severely restrict the freedom of movement of the mission. The Military component would be considerably slowed down in areas and times where fighting is ongoing, and the movement of the mission’s civilian component or UNPOL may be curtailed. Although the risk of casualties would be low, an uncooperative host state can make movement difficult for all the mission’s components by administrative and political means, threatening the mission’s ability to fulfil its mandate.
While hostilities between parties and an uncooperative host state are subject to political solutions, maintaining freedom of movement in an environment in which explosive ordnance and IEDs constitute a threat is a military–technical issue. An aggressor may deploy IEDs to reduce or prevent the freedom of movement of the forces it is targeting. This often creates a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment in which such aggressors have freedom to operate and are able to project their power. Maintaining freedom of movement within an IED-threat environment is therefore a key focus of IED-threat mitigation via explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities.
Establishing rules on where to enable, limit or deny access will be a key consideration for the MLT in its dealings with the host government.
Conversely, parties on the ground might test the credibility and resilience of peacekeepers by restricting their freedom of movement. As a result, it is essential that the mission’s Military component secures the operational and tactical mobility of all personnel across the mission area. Cooperation on this matter may also be an indicator of the general level of consent for and commitment to the peace process, and of overall consent for the presence of the peace operation.
4.3.1 Operational activities
The mission’s operational activities to support this output include:
- Identifying, through study, the vulnerabilities of key routes.
- Tracking the viability of all routes via the JOC.
- Establishing an EOD/IED threat-mitigation working group.
- Developing EOD capabilities, removing ERW from abandoned storage sites and promoting safe ammunition management.
- Implementing and sustaining the SOFA or status of mission agreement (SOMA).
- Exploiting IED events through technical and tactical analysis.
- Contributing to the degradation of IED networks by implementing recording and recovery of EO components.
4.3.2 Benchmarks
Short-term
- Routes and air heads are secure, and alternate routes are established.
- Humanitarian supplies are moving.
- Spoilers and their areas of operation have been identified.
- Mines and IEDs identified and priorities for clearing established.
Medium-term
- Population can move on key routes without violence.
- Key strategic resources are protected.
- Police has restored law and order in critical areas.
- Status of routes updated.
Long-term
- National authorities are able to ensure full freedom of movement for people and goods throughout the territory.
- Re-establishment of customs and border procedures consistent with international standards.
- Mine action continues.
4.3.3 Responsibilities and coordination
The host government is responsible for ensuring freedom of movement for its population and the peacekeeping mission. The SRSG will need to urge and remind all parties to adhere to their agreements. The mission needs to track the state of freedom of movement through the JOC and the Force HQ. Meanwhile, the FC and the Police Commissioner need to ensure compliance on the ground. Components involved in mine action (both military and civilian) will also have an important role to play with regard to freedom of movement, as will the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other relevant UN agencies dealing with the movement of refugees and IDPs. Coordination is therefore essential, as is close political engagement with the parties.
4.3.4 Resources
Mission resources and deployment timelines will determine both when and which freedom of movement activities are implemented. Early resources and speed of deployment will facilitate compliance with agreements. Donors need to provide appropriate resources for mine action so that routes and essential locations can be cleared. Technological assets will have to be available to enable this task.
4.3.5 Challenges and risks
- Host government gradually adopts a stance of non-compliance with the terms of the SOFA.
- Host government cannot ensure freedom of movement.
- Lack of credible information on mine and ERW contamination.
- Peace process falters and fighting resumes.
- Factions/spoilers restrict the movement and/or access of peace operations personnel.
- Factions/spoilers use freedom of movement to exert political leverage.
- Territorial integrity is lacking, enabling influx of external spoilers.
- Regional actors are not supportive.
4.3.6 Considerations
Balancing freedom of movement and security
Population and resource controls may initially need to be implemented to control factions and spoilers and establish security. The extent to which this is required will depend on the situation. These controls should be explained to the population in order to maintain transparency in the mission’s communications and to manage public expectations.
Balancing the required performance with the available capabilities
Counter-IED/mine intelligence requires the fusion of multiple information layers to provide a detailed understanding of spoiler- IED tactics, techniques and procedures; every unit must maintain a current and clear understanding of the status of each route.
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets will provide technical capability for the identification of IEDs and mines. Electronic counter-IED assets can be utilized as a threat- mitigation asset on vehicles or on personnel required to move from, through or to an area with an assessed radio-controlled IED threat. Force generation to obtain the necessary capabilities is a highly politicized process that requires a good tripartite relationship between the MLT, TCCs and the DPO.
Immediate or gradual movement controls
Immediate and gradual movement controls each have their pros and cons. While experience shows that the latter are more viable and pragmatic, humanitarian considerations may well determine the appropriate type of controls.
Controlling movement of national resources
In a resource-based conflict, protection and prevention of the illegitimate movement of national and strategic resources could be of great significance. Consequently, movement control efforts and other security tasks related to this issue will have to be prioritized from the inception of the mission
Respecting host-country sovereignty while maintaining freedom of movement for the mission
As a host government maintains (or regains) control of its territory, possible interruption, restrictions or even denial of mission movement may occur. The SOFA/SOMA should be forward looking and adaptable, as the host government exerts increased sovereignty over its territories. Full freedom of movement is essential for a mission from an operational view, as restrictions can inhibit its ability to perform mandated tasks. In addition, accepting limitations imposed by the parties automatically undermines the credibility of the mission, signalling that it can be manipulated without consequences.
UNMIS: Maximizing operational effect of the military component
With increased threats in peacekeeping environments and attacks on UN bases and personnel, there has been a growing demand for more troops for force protection. An emerging dilemma for mission leadership is ensuring a balanced military deployment that secures static installations while retaining sufficient mobility to respond to developing critical situations.
The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had a mandated strength of approximately 10,000 troops to support the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. While South Sudan supported UNMIS operations, looking forward to the 2011 Independence Referendum, operational consent was selective in the north, especially in Darfur and Abyei. Many UNMIS troops were thus hesitant to maneuver.
Since surface mobility was confined to mine-cleared roads, cross-country movement was being conducted by daytime aviation effort. The mission had limited access to outer reaches, mostly being provided by military observer long-range patrols with limited staying power.
There was a necessity to infuse maneuver culture in the mission to sustain control of far-flung areas, which was crucial for effective monitoring of the 1956 border Trans Line redeployment of the Sudanese Armed Forces and South Sudan People’s Liberation Army.
Thus, UNMIS pioneered the concept of a temporary operating base (TOB) – a light footprint deployment for conducting need-based tasks. There was initial resistance from troop-contributing countries as well as the Director of Mission Support, as this required effort.
TOBs were provided with field scale accommodation, rations and medical support. They became additional pivots for gaining access to the entire geographical space. Initially two TOBs were deployed, one each in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal.
Later each sector developed the capability to deploy one TOB. TOBs can be an effective way for the mission to establish freedom of movement and dominate space economically.
Lt. Gen. Jasbir Lidder, Force Commander (2006–08) and DSRSG (2011–12), UNMIS